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INTRODUCTION
On December 6, 1984 a small commuter plane crashed
on take off from Jacksonville, Florida, killing all thirteen
on board.' To the surprise of many Americans, the craft
involved, a Bandeirante, had been manufactured in Brazil
and, moreover, other planes made in that country were
being flown by some twenty-two United States airlines. 2
Accustomed to reading about the Boeing 747, the Mc-
Donald Douglas DC 10, or the European airbus, the
reader might well wonder how Brazil had come to appear
on the world stage of aircraft suppliers.
Thirteen years ago, this Journal published an article of
mine about Brazil's fledgling airplane industry.3 A tropi-
cal country best known for Carnival, inflation, and pov-
erty,4 Brazil seemed an unlikely candidate for such a
"high tech" industry. Most foreign experts greeted news
of the venture with amused skepticism. Chances of suc-
cess were characterized as "rather dim."' 5 Brazilians
themselves have remarked on the parallel to Don Quix-
ote.6 On the other hand, having lived in Brazil for two
years, I had acquired some feel for the character of the
people and thought they just might "pull it off."
Today, EMBRAER, 7 the Brazilian aircraft company, has
turned out more than 3,000 planes and ranks as the
world's sixth largest manufacturer in the field of general
aviation. 8 Hundreds of these Brazilian-made craft have
1 North, NTSB Scrutinizes Stabilizer Loss in Crash of Bandeirante, Av. WK. & SPACE
TECH., Dec. 17, 1984, at 26.
2 Ingersoll & Lowenstein, FAA Orders U.S. Carriers to Inspect Planes of Model In-
volvedin PBA Crash, Wall. St.J., Dec. 10, 1984, at 5, col. 1; Witkin, Planes Like One in
Florida Crash Face Inspection, N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1984, at Al col. 7.
Carl, The Brazilian Experiment in the Creation of an Aircraft Industry, 38J. AIR. L. &
COM. 35 (1972).
4 The per capita gross national product for Brazil was U.S. $357 in 1968. U.S.
Agency for Int'l Dev., Presidential Mission to Brazil (1969) (unpublished
document).
It had been asserted that EMBRAER's craft would cost twice as much as a
similar plane in the free market. Bus. WK., March 7, 1970, at 46.
6 Dias, EMBRAER Voando em Seguran~a, BANA, Nov. 28, 1979, at 21.
1 "EMBRAER" stands for Empresa Brasileira de Aeronftutica.
8 I.e., small and medium sized aircraft. Banco do Brazil, Monthly Newsletter,
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been sold in the international market and EMBRAER's
transactions range from Egypt through Papua New
Guinea to the United Kingdom. So successful has the
Brazilian venture proved that not long ago two American
competitors brought legal action in an effort to limit EM-
BRAER's access to the American market through imposi-
tion of a countervailing duty.9 As Business Week has
concluded: "Brazil's EMBRAER has earned its wings as
the one genuinely successful aircraft manufacturer in the
Third World."' 0
To launch the new industry, Brazil created a unique
legal structure. In view of the impressive results achieved,
it seems appropriate now to reexamine that Brazilian ex-
perience. Other countries, especially Third World na-
tions, may find it profitable to study this model for
possible adaptation to their development needs.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY
Brazilians trace their primacy in aviation back some dis-
tance. They, in fact, claim that the first airplane was in-
vented, not by the Wright brothers, but by their own
compatriot, Santos Dumont. Moreover, an effort to com-
mercialize air transport was started in Brazil as early as
1890 when Leopoldo Correira da Silva floated stock at
100 milreis per share in the Brazilian Air Transport Com-
pany for the construction of dirigibles in Rio de Janeiro.ll
Although the venture failed to get off the ground due to
inadequate capitalization, Brazilians never relinquished
their dream of a domestic aviation industry.
Somebody said that it couldn't be done, But he
...replied
Aug. 1984, at 4. Only twenty-one nations now design and build their own aircraft.
Id. See Condom, Brazilian Aerospace Comes of Age, 1984 IrrERAVIA 1339; Brazil:
Number Six and Still Going Strong, SOUTH, June 1984, at 74.
9 Int'l Trade Comm., Investigation No. 701-TA-199, Certain Commuter Air-
planes from Brazil, Oct. 6, 1982, 47 Fed. Reg. 44,166 (1982) see infra, notes 300-
313 and accompanying text.
10 A Third World Plane Maker Targets the RAF, Bus. WK., June 19, 1984, at 37.
1 Uma Boa A~do Nas Asas, Guia de Incentivos Fiscais, 79 VEJA 117 (1970).
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That "maybe it couldn't," but he would be one
Who wouldn't say so 'til he'd tried.
So he buckled right in . . . as he tackled the thing
That couldn't be done, and he did it.1 2
Efforts to develop an airplane began in 1929 with pro-
duction of the "Rio deJaneiro"; 3 a few decades later the
government created the Central Aeronautics Center,
which had the only wind tunnel in Latin America. 14 By
1969, Neiva, a private firm, had turned out 120 Regente
C-42s, a metal monomotor aircraft, which was the first
Brazilian plane to be manufactured by assembly line
methods.15 Meanwhile, Aerotec, another private com-
pany, was also building small planes, primarily for military
usage. Scores of other enterprises manufactured aircraft
parts such as instruments, seat belts and accessories. 16
Nevertheless, these endeavors by private industry could
not be viewed as flowing purely from the operation of
market forces since the government, besides direct and
indirect subsidies, also purchased most of the products of
these plants.' 7 No private firm in Brazil possessed the
capital resources required to independently design a
plane, construct a prototype, conduct the test flights and
develop a market. Likewise, Brazil lacked the sophisti-
cated technological tradition needed to produce a mod-
ern commercial aircraft.' 8  On the other hand, a
substantial portion of the cost of building a conventional
plane is labor, and manpower was one resource Brazil had
12 Edgar Guest, It Couldn't Be Done, in FIVE THOUSAND QUOTATIONS FOR ALL OC-
CASIONS 272 (L. Henry ed. 1981).
is 0 V6o da EMBRAER, Guia de Incentivos Fiscais, 117 VEJA 78 (1971).
'4 The Portugese term for the Center is "Centro Tcnico de Aeroniutica". The
CTA trained a pool of technical workers, many of whom have supplied other Bra-
zilian industries such as the automotive sector. Interview with James R. Cheek,
Transportation Officer, American Embassy in Rio de Janeiro (June 3, 1971).
15 0 Vdo da EMBRAER, supra note 13. Sixty-five percent of the components of
the Regente C-42 were made in Brazil. Id. See also Letter from James R. Cheek,
Transporation Officer, American Embassy, Rio de Janeiro, to J.A. Bede of Bede
Aircraft Co. (Dec. 29, 1970).
16 0 Vdo da EMBRAER, supra note 13.
17 Letter from James R. Cheek, supra note 15.
I8 Transporte Moderno, Jan. 1968, at 75.
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in excess (although skilled workmen were still in short
supply).
Meanwhile Brazil, which was trying to integrate a nation
of 100 million people spread throughout an area larger
than the continental United States, still lacked an ade-
quate railroad or highway system.' 9 The main link to the
country's interior was by plane; even cattle were being
shipped to market by air. This expanding need for air
transport was forcing Brazil to use her limited foreign ex-
change resources to purchase not only the large commer-
cial jets from the industrialized world, but also to spend
U.S. $10 million yearly for general aviation aircraft from
American suppliers, such as Piper, Cessna and Beech-
craft.20 That market for small craft was growing at six per-
cent annually.2
The year 1969 found Brazil enjoying an economic
boom. Industrial production had increased thirteen per-
cent;22 she had turned out 350,000 automobiles and her
new shipbuilding facilities had just completed fifty-eight
large vessels.23 Exhilarated by this progress and pressed
by transport needs, the nation's leaders decided the time
was ripe for a major attempt to create a Brazilian aviation
industry.
'9 Brazil Herald (Rio de Janeiro), Mar. 3, 1971, at lIB, col. 1. By the mid-
sixties, Brazil had approximately 1,200 registered airports, eighty of which were
maritime or river facilties. Many of those airports were only graded landing
strips, but thirty had paved airstrips and modern ground facilities. Even then, air
traffic between Rio de Janeiro and Sgo Paulo was second only to that between
New York and Chicago. U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, AREA HANDBOOK FOR BRAZIL
562 (1964) [hereinafter cited as AREA HANDBOOK].
20 Letter from James R. Cheek, supra note 15.
21 0 Vdo da EMBRAER, supra note 13.
22 Trubek, Law, Planning and the Development of the Brazilian Capital Market: A Study
of Law in Economic Change, THE BULLETIN (NYU), Apr. 1971, at 78 (citing table
prepared by the Get6lio Vargas Foundation).
23 BRAZILIAN NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF COMMERCE, REPORT ON BRAZIL 9
(1971).
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II. THE BRAZILIAN LEGAL STRUCTURE
A. Capitalizing the Aircraft Industry
1. The Mixed Economy Corporation
a. Historical Antecedents
In planning for development, some Brazilian leaders
wished to rely mainly on the private sector, while others
believed that basic industries should be owned by the
state.24 At the same time, many of the strongest defend-
ers of capitalism admitted that domestic private resources
were insufficient to finance the development of certain
"essential" industries. Moreover, article 163 of the Bra-
zilian Constitution authorizes the state to enact legislation
intervening in the economy when necessary to establish
an economic sector which otherwise could not be effec-
tively developed through private initiative and free
competition.25
Faced with these considerations, the country's decision-
makers evolved a peculiarly Brazilian compromise. The
bulk of industrial investments were left within the domain
of private business; a few projects, however, such as the
National Economic Development Bank,2 6 were reserved
for corporations wholly owned by the government.
Finally, mixed economy corporations were established
to carry out other activities in which the government had a
24 AREA HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 488. During the last twenty years, Brazil
has frequently declared itself a free enterprise nation. When the current military
regime came to power in 1964, the opening paragraph of its Program for Eco-
nomic Action stated, "Government Action in democratic political systems should
be oriented to establishing conditions which assure the most efficient functioning
of the free enterprise or price economy." Trubek, supra note 22, at 33 n.38.
25 EMENDA CONSTIrUCIONAL No. 1, art. 163 (Braz. 1969). The Brazilian Consti-
tution stipulates that such state intervention should be used only in a supplemen-
tary fashion, i.e., when private enterprise alone cannot accomplish the goal. Id.
art. 170, § 1.
26 Law 5662 of May 21, 1971, 35 LEX (Braz.) 877. Examples of other enter-
prises wholly owned by the government include the National Housing Bank, Law
5762 of Dec. 14, 1971, 35 LEX (Braz.) 1625; the S~o Francisco Valley Develop-
ment Company, Law 6088 of July 16, 1974, 38 LEX (Braz.) 860; and the Post &
Telegraph Company, Decree Law 509 of Mar. 20, 1969, 33 LEX (Braz.) 313.
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special interest.27 Funds to start these mixed economy
corporations originate with the government which takes
an equivalent number of equity shares in the company.
Shares not held by the government are offti'ed at public
sale to private investors.
Such mixed economy corporations are legal entities,2 8
created by special legislation to carry out a specified eco-
nomic objective. 29 The Brazilian Corporations Code gov-
erns these mixed economy companies; 30 if their shares are
publicly traded, the Brazilian security laws and regula-
tions also apply.3 1
Mixed economy companies were developed in the hope
that they could move rapidly and efficiently by following
the practices of individual entrepreneurs. 32 As Professor
Serpa de Santa Maria writes, "We defend the mixed com-
pany as a moderate and well balanced intervention by the
state, which avoids killing private initiative, prevents driv-
ing off the cooperation of the private sector, and which
can achieve the technical efficiencies of businessmen.
33
Despite such characteristics, the mixed economy corpo-
rations also have certain features of wholly state-owned
companies. Professor Hamel has pointed out that these
27 One authority traces the roots of these organizations to the great colonizing
firms, such as the Dutch East India trading company. J. SERPA DE SANTA MARIA,
SOCIEDADES DE ECONOMIA MISTA E EMPRESAS P0BLICAS 46 (1979).
28 Decree Law 200 of Feb. 25, 1967, 31 LEX (Braz.) 864.
29 Id.
so Braz. Corp. Code, arts. 235-264, Law 6404 of Dec. 15, 1976, 40 LEX (Braz.)
899, 965-72.
I1 d. art. 235, § 1, 33 LEX (Braz.) 965. A system of securities registration and
regulation was created by the Capital Markets Law on July 14, 1965. Law 4728,
29 LEx (Braz.) 954. This law, patterned after the United States federal model,
uses a disclosure rather than a merit approach to reviewing new issues. Adminis-
tration of the law was placed in the Securities Commission (Comissio de Valores
Mobiliirios) created by Law 6385 of Dec. 7, 1976, 40 LEX (Braz.) 851.
A mixed economy company may not be declared bankrupt, but its assets may be
attached or executed against, and its controlling shareholder (the government) is
vicariously liable for its obligations. Braz. Corp. Code, supra note 30, art. 242. See
also,J. PINHEIRo NETO, DOING BUSINESS IN BRAZIL §§ 2.173-.185 (1979) [hereaf-
ter cited as PINHEIRO].
32 SERPA, supra note 27, at 160.
33 Id. at 19 [translated by author - Eds.].
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entities fall somewhere between private and public law.
"They cannot be strictly a subject of private law because
the state participates with considerable power. . . . On
the other hand, we do not believe that only public law [is
involved] because such companies operate as ordinary
private companies vis-a-vis third parties, as well as their
"134own employees ... .
As of 1982, Brazil had twenty-three mixed economy
corporations. Economic sectors covered included petro-
leum, telecommunications, reinsurance and film
production.35
b. Creation of EMBRAER
Prior to formation of EMBRAER, its most important
product, the Bandeirante plane, had already been devel-
oped in 1965 by the government's Center for Aviation
Technology (CTA).36 CTA, however, failed in its efforts
during the late sixties to find a private company to manu-
facture the craft. As Ozires Silva, the President of EM-
BRAER recounts, "It was the era of the 'Brazilian
[economic] miracle' during which everyone was investing
little and earning a great deal of money-and EMBRAER
was exactly the opposite. It demanded a large investment
and the risk was extremely high."'37
4 j. NOGUEIRA DE QUEIROZ, DIREITO EcONOMICO 92 & n.12 (1982) (citing In-
stituto de Direito P6blico e Cie ncia Politica de FGV, Organizado dos Sociedades de
Ec6nomia Mista na Frantiga, 52 R.D.A. 550 (1957) [hereinafter cited as QUIEROZ].
35 QUE ROZ, supra note 34, at 93-94. In 1965, the government authorized the
sale to the public of up to 49% of the stock in mixed economy companies. Law
4728 of July 14, 1965, art. 60, 29 LEX (Braz.) 972.
36 GAZETA MERCANTIL, August 20, 1984.
37 Id. Mr. Silva recounts that he participated in many meetings with private busi-
nessmen at the time; they told him "If you think we are going to invest one cent in
this plane, you are very mistaken." A Indistria Aerondutica a um Passo da Maturidade,
NEG6cios EM EXAME, May 25, 1977, at 23 [hereinafter EXAME]. Almir Medeiros
of the Aerotec Company affirmed that a simple transfer of resources to a private
firm would not have solved the problem: "These projects were expensive and the
maturation period very long. Thus, only, an enterprise which had obtained gov-
ernment assistance would be capable of developing it." Id. at 24. Jose Neiva,
President of the Neiva aircraft company, added, "Only EMBRAER would be able
to give stability to this sector through the use of exclusive [fiscal] incentives, re-
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Thus, the government turned to the mixed economy
model and established EMBRAER (the Brazilian Aviation
Company) by Decree Law 770 of August 19, 1969 [D.L.
770].38 Shortly thereafter the President approved its
charter.
i. Capital Structure
D.L. 770 called for an initial capitalization of Cr $50
million,40 with fifty-one percent of the voting stock to be
purchased by the government (through the Ministry of
Aviation) 41 while the remainder would be offered to pri-
vate firms or individuals.4 2 As EMBRAER has thrived
over the years, the amount of its authorized capital has
been periodically increased.43 The percentage of private
shareholders in EMBRAER today far exceeds that of the
government. Private ownership of EMBRAER shares has
grown from a mere 18.1% in 1970 to 93% in 1984. 44
Nonetheless, the Ministry of Aviation retains control since
it still holds a majority of the common stock.45 The bulk
sources, industrial capacity and technology, as well as superiority in marketing
ability." Id.
18 Decree Law 770 of Aug. 19, 1969, 33 LEX (Braz.) 1201, by-laws approved, De-
cree 65,402 of Oct. 21, 1969, 33 LEX (Braz.) 1759, as amended by Decree 71,316 of
Nov. 6, 1972, 36 LEX (Braz.) 1423 [hereinafter D.L. 770].
39 Decree 66,005 of Dec. 30, 1969, 33 LEX (Braz.) 2599.
4o D. L. 770, supra note 38, art. 4. No effort will be made in this article to con-
vert cruzeiros into dollars because high inflation rates over the years have caused
the exchange rates to vary widely. However, it can be stated that in 1969 when
EMBRAER was started this Cr$ 50 million would have been equivalent to about
U.S. $12.5 million.
41 Id.
42 Id. Article 5 requires the government to acquire sufficient additional stock to
hold 51% of the voting shares whenever EMBRAER's capital is increased. Id. art.
5. 43 For example, the capital was increased in 1972 to Cr $250 million by Decree
71,616 of December 22, 1972, arts. 1 & 6, 36 LEx (Braz.) 1653. It was further
increased to Cr $500 million by Decree 78,994 of Dec. 22, 1976, art. 1, 40 LEX
(Braz.) 995. Each share had a par value of Cr $1. Id. By 1978, the authorized and
issued shares amount exceeded Cr $842 million. Dias, supra note 6, at 25.
Besides such capital infusions, the Ministry of Aviation is authorized to transfer
property, land, machines, capital equipment and materials to EMBRAER. D.L.
770, supra note 38, art. 16.
44 EXAME, supra note 37, at 23, and Condom, supra note 8, at 1339.
41 EXAME, supra note 37, at 23. The various decrees increasing the authorized
524 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [50
of the shares held by private persons are preferred shares
which carry no voting rights.46
ii. Governance
Overseeing EMBRAER is a seven-person Board of Di-
rectors, whose chair is appointed by the President of Bra-
zil. Three directors are nominated by the Ministers of
Finance, Commerce, and Planning respectively, with sub-
sequent confirmation by the nation's president. Also
serving as directors are the general manager and two
other persons elected at the shareholders' meeting. 7
The company is managed by an Executive Board com-
posed of a general manager and the managers of indus-
trial relations, production, technical matters, finance, and
marketing.4" Managers are elected at the shareholders'
meeting.4 9 To compete with private industry in attracting
management personnel, the law further authorizes the
stockholders' meeting to set the salaries of these five man-
agers in accord with the comparable free market levels in
the region. Thus, compensation of these top managers is
not limited to the amounts allowed for civil servants.50
capital ensured that voting control remained in the government. For example,
the 1976 decree authorized 75 million shares to be held by the state, 50 million
other common shares, and 375 million preferred shares. Decree 78,994, supra
note 43, art. 10.
46 Decree 71,616, supra note 43, art. 10. Preferred shares are also denied pre-
emptive rights to buy new shares; such rights are enjoyed by the common share-
holders. Id. art. 11.
47 Id. art. 14. Decree 89,309 ofJan. 18, 1984, authorized the Office of the Gen-
eral Counsel of the National Treasury Department to represent the National Gov-
ernment at all general meetings of shareholders in mixed-economy companies in
order to defend the interests of the Treasury. Such companies must give this
office a sixty day prior notice of shareholder meetings and thirty days prior notice
for extraordinary meetings. Pinheiro Neto, Legal Letter, Jan. 1984, at 1.
-8 Decree 71,616, supra note 43, art. 17.
49 Id. art. 17, § 1.
50 Id. art. 17, § 2; D.L. 770, supra note 38, art. 12. Recently, however, some
restrictions have been placed on salaries paid to employees of state companies.
As of 1984, state companies may no longer pay their officers or employees more
than thirteen salaries in any year, including the Christmas bonus. Decree Law
2100 of Dec. 28, 1983, 47 LEx (Braz.) 565 (amending Decree Law 1971 of Nov.
30, 1982, 46 LEx (Braz.) 510. Those persons hired prior to this decree retain
their benefits, profit-sharing, and bonuses. Id. art. 1, § 2. Article 1 of Decree Law
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iii. Reinvestment of Profit
The law also mandates that 45% of the net profits be
reinvested or allocated to certain reserve funds. For ex-
ample, 5% of the net profit must be channeled to the
Fund for Research and Development and 10% to the In-
vestment Fund.51 The balance of the profit may be dis-
posed of by the shareholders. Typically, Latin American
businessmen have preferred to take their earnings out
quickly, thus this compulsory reinvestment provision at-
tempts to inculcate a new tradition of reserving funds for
research and development, as well as for future
expansion.
2. Techniques for Marketing Private Shares
With majority control in the government, private pur-
chasers of EMBRAER would have no real voice in the
company's operations. Moreover, as a new firm in an un-
tested field, EMBRAER was not yet a profitable enterprise
and might never become one. In a free marketplace, such
shares would hold little attraction for private investors.
The organizers of the company, however, were deter-
mined to make it a true mixed-economy corporation with
substantial private participation. Hence, they resorted to
special mechanisms the government had previously
designed to enhance the marketability of equity shares
and to promote investment in certain preferred economic
sectors or regions.
a. Background of Investment Incentives
When the military government took power in Brazil in
1964, the securities market was a relatively undeveloped
institution. Although there were twenty-one stock ex-
changes, with listings on the exchange being obligatory
1971 of 1982 provides that no officer, employee or director of a State company
may receive a monthly compensation that exceeds the remuneration and al-
lowances granted to the President of the Republic. Decree Law 1971 of Nov. 30,
1982, art. 1, 46 LEX (Braz.) 510, at 1.
51 Decree 71,616, supra note 43, art. 35.
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for Brazilian corporations, 2 only about five percent of
the securities were actually traded. The combined volume
of transactions for all exchanges, a mere US $146 million
in 1961, ) reflected the public's traditional preference for
investments in real estate or high interest loans over equi-
ties. At the same time, galloping inflation, which at one
point in the early sixties reached 140% on an annual ba-
sis, had devoured the cash reserves of businesses, leaving
them starved for the no longer available medium and long
term credit.
To attract private savings to equity investments, to im-
prove the liquidity of private companies, and to create a
vigorous securities market, the Capital Markets Law was
enacted in 1965." 4 This statute contains provisions to
prevent fraud and price rigging, to regulate brokerage
and investment companies, and to ensure public access to
essential information about stocks.55
Along with these reforms came the concept of "democ-
ratization of capital", i.e., the idea that closely-held corpo-
rations should be opened to public participation and that
ownership of equity shares should be more widely dissem-
inated among the Brazilian populace. Law 4506 of No-
vember 30, 196456 granted tax benefits to companies
which opened their shares to public sale.57 Further, the
52 Except for the Brazilian equivalent of closely-held companies. U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, ESTABLISHING A BUSINESS IN BRAZIL 24 (O.B.R. 66-10, 1966).
53 AREA HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 604.
- Law 4728, supra note 31.
55 Id. arts. 2-3. In addition, the statute authorized corporations for the first time
to issue convertible debentures. Id.
56 Law 4506 of Nov. 30, 1964, art. 39, 28 LEX (Braz.) 1241, 1252. To en-
courage both reinvestment of earnings and the opening up of closely-held firms to
the public, an additional tax was imposed on the company for any profits distrib-
uted. Firms with open capital were then exempted from that supplemental tax.
Id. arts. 38-39. In the late sixties that supplemental tax was running at 5%. De-
cree Law 94 of Dec. 30, 1966, art. 11, 31 LEX (Braz.) 42.
Open-capital companies were relieved from paying certain taxes and allowed to
deduct dividends paid (up to a specified limit) as an expense for tax purposes. P.
GARLAND, DOING BUSINESS IN AND WITH BRAZIL 52 (1971); Decree Law 1790 of
June 9, 1980, arts. 1-3, 44 LEX (Braz.) 257.
57 Open-capital companies are those whose securities are traded on the stock
exchange or over the counter. Law 6404, supra note 30, art. 4. Such securities
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law offered tax deductions to individuals and firms to en-
courage the purchase of stock in these open-capital
companies."
Of course, no tax incentive scheme will operate effec-
tively unless two basic conditions first exist: (1) a broadly
based tax at rates sufficiently high to induce a sizable
number of persons to undertake the paperwork necessary
to obtain the tax relief, and (2) an administrative structure
capable of collecting those taxes and enforcing penalties
for evasion of revenue laws. Although conspicuously ab-
sent throughout much of Brazil's history, these prerequi-
sites could be considered satisfied by the late sixties due
to a massive tax reform instituted in 1964. 59
Another mechanism created in 1967 came to have a ma-
jor impact on the Brazilian capital markets. Decree Law
No. 157 (D.L. 157) permitted an individual taxpaper to
credit against his income tax amounts invested in author-
ized financial institutions which then reinvested these D.L.
157 funds in shares or debentures of private firms ap-
proved by the Central Bank of Brazil.60 In effect, the
taxpaper received a 100% tax credit for amounts invested
in D.L. 157 funds up to a prescribed ceiling. For some
time that ceilng was set at 12% of the tax due. 61 Later
must be registered with the Securities Commission (CVM). Id. Trading of securi-
ties over the counter means sales made outside the stock exchange, such as
through the intermediaries like investment banks, brokerage companies, distribu-
tor companies, and self-employed agents authorized by the foregoing institutions.
CVM Instruction No. 32 of 1984, cited in Pinheiro Neto, Legal Letter, Mar. 1984,
at 4.
58 Decree Law 1338 of July 23, 1974, art. 2(j), 38 LEX (Braz.) 862, 863, as
amended by Decree Law 1641 of Dec. 7, 1978, art. 8, 42 LEX (Braz.) 1096, 1099.
59 Law 4506 of Nov. 30, 1964, 28 LEX (Braz.) 1241. During the sixties, the
number of trained government tax inspectors was vastly increased. For the first
time, some individuals were actually imprisoned for tax evasion. Declaration
forms were distributed free, as contrasted with the prior practice of selling them
at stationery stores. As a result of these measures, the number of tax returns filed
jumped from 840,000 in 1960 to more than 6 million in 1970. Correo da Manhd
(Rio deJaneiro), Nov. 20, 1970. See also, Liker, The Legal and Institutional Framework
of Tax Administration in Developing Countries, 14 UCLA L. REV. 240 (1966).
- Decree Law 157 of Feb. 10, 1967, 31 LEX (Braz.) 351.
61 Trubek, supra note 22, at 57. To qualify for this tax credit, the taxpayers had
to hold the D.L. 157 shares for four years, although partial redemptions were
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that flat ceiling was replaced by a sliding scale with the
lower ceilings applying to the higher incomes and vice
versa; by 1981, those ceilings ranged from 10% to 24%
of the tax due.62
At first the benefits of D.L. 157 were not widely under-
stood and only 35,000 individual taxpayers had used the
credit by 1968. By 1969, however, D.L. 157 investments
were earning a return in excess of 40%,63 and as of 1972,
more than three million persons were taking advantage of
this credit.6 4 Since it cost the taxpayer nothing, the
number of participants continued to grow throughout the
seventies, especially since persons receiving Cr $5,000 or
more now had to file tax returns.6 5
These various incentive programs resulted in a boom in
the secondary market and reversed a long period of de-
pression in stock prices. One leading indicator, the SN
index, showed that the real average price of shares rose
26.5% in 1968 and 151% in 1969. The index continued
rising in 1970. Even more impressive was the growth in
volume of trading on the Rio de Janeiro exchange which
jumped from Cr $165 million in 1965 to Cr $2,800 mil-
lion (US $571 million) in 1970.66
In addition to the laws directed toward development of
the securities markets, the government passed a series of
acts providing generous tax incentives for investments in
particular regions or designated economic sectors. For
example, a private company67 is allowed to take a credit
against its income tax for investments in new projects in
permitted in years two and three. Id. at 57 n.65 Decree Law 1109 of June 26,
1970, 34 LEX (Braz.) 581.
6 A. TEBECHRANI, F. CAMPOS, J. MACHADO, REGULAMENTO DO IMPOSTO DE
RENDA PARA 1982 117 [hereinafter cited as TEBECHRANI].
63 Guia de Incentivos Fiscais, 79 VEJA 23 (1970).
64 Wall St.J., Apr. 5, 1972, at 1, col. 4. (statement of Ant6nio Delfim Neto, the
then Minister of Finance).
65 Correo Da Manh5 (Rio DeJaneiro), Nov. 20, 1970.
66 Trubek, supra note 22, at 71-72.
67 1 have translated "juridical person" as "company". The term encompasses a
variety of Brazilian business organizations, including corporations and limited
partnerships.
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the Northeast, in the Amazon, or in the tourism, forestry
or fishing industries. Credits for investments in such fa-
vored economic sectors may be combined so long as the
total cumulative credits do not exceed fifty percent of the
tax due.6"
b. EMBRAER Tax Incentives
The techniques devised to make EMBRAER's shares
marketable were meshed with the pre-existing incentive
system. Any company operating in Brazil can take a
100% credit against its income tax for amounts to be used
for the acquisition of EMBRAER shares. The total credit
taken for this purpose, however, may not exceed 1% of
the tax due.69 Thus, to the extent the purchases of EM-
BRAER shares fall within this 1% ceiling, the investment
costs the taxpayer nothing.
Moreover, amounts represented by the acquisition 'of
EMBRAER stock are not included within the 50% limit on
combined tax credits for other eligible investments (e.g.,
the Northeast); rather, they can be added to those invest-
ment credits to permit a maximum total credit of 51 %.
7
68 See, e.g., Law 5174 of Oct. 27, 1966, art. 17, 30 LEX (Braz.) 1521 . For a
detailed description of the basic incentives, see B. CARL, A GUIDE TO INCENTIVES
FOR INVESTING IN BRAZIL (1972). These various incentives were extended through
fiscal year 1986 by Decree Law No. 2134 of June 26, 1984. DOU-1, June 27,
1984, noted in Pinheiro Neto, Legal Letter, June 1984.
69 D.L. 770, supra note 38, art. 7. The credit, which may only be claimed by
companies, was originally available through 1975. Id. It has since been extended
through 1986 by supplemental legislation. See Decree Law 1376 of Dec. 12, 1974,
art. 11, 38 LEX (Braz.) 1153, 2255 (extending the credit for new issues of EM-
BRAER stock); Decree Law 1802 of Aug. 19, 1980, art. 1, 44 LEX (Braz.) 428
(extending the credit through 1982); Decree Law 1898 of Dec. 21, 1981, art. 2, 45
LEX (Braz.) 695 (extending the credit through 1985); and Decree Law 2134 of
June 26, 1984 (extending the credit through fiscal year 1986).
70 D.L. 770, supra note 38, art. 7, § 1. After 1971, applicable laws channeled
30% of the funds credited by firms for investments in other privileged sectors,
such as the Northeast, into the Program for National Integration. See, e.g., Decree
Law 1106 of June 16, 1970, art. 5, § 2, 34 LEX (Braz.) 497. In effect, this meant
that the taxpayer taking a 50% credit for investment in the Northeast would lose
30% of the 50% credit to the public treasury. Since the company received no
shares for that 30%, it really obtained an effective credit of only 35% (i.e., 30% x
50% subtracted from 50% equals 35%). EMBRAER, however, was exempted
from these restrictions and private concerns could therefore receive the full bene-
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In fact, EMBRAER adopted as its slogan: "Surpass the
fifty percent barrier on income tax credits."'"
Article 8 of D.L. 770 also attempted to offer individual
taxpayers an incentive by permitting them to use the re-
sources which otherwise would have been channeled to
financial institutions under D.L. 15772 to purchase newly
issued shares of EMBRAER.73
B. Effect of These Capital Formation Techniques
1. Marshalling of Funds
The above tax incentives succeeded in attracting a size-
able amount of capital to EMBRAER. By 1978, more than
Cr $530 million had been channelled into EMBRAER
from these taxpayer/investors. 4 Examples of some of the
major taxpayer/shareholders include Volkswagen do Bra-
sil, Mercedes Benz do Brasil, and General Motors do Bra-
sil. 75 ByJanuary 1984, the preferred shares of EMBRAER
were spread among 226,506 private holders.7 6
Of course, in granting these tax credits the government
gave up an equivalent amount in revenue. Alternatively,
the government could have kept the tax monies and used
them to acquire 100% of EMBRAER's stock. Once the
company became profitable, all the dividends would have
fit of the one percent credit for their purchases of EMBRAER stock. Id., art. 5,
§ 3.
71 Brazil Herald (Rio deJaneiro), Mar. 3, 1971, at lIB.
72 See supra note 60 and accompanying text for a discussion of D.L. 157.
7' D.L. 770, supra note 38, art. 8.
74 Dias, supra note 6, at 26.
73 GAZETA MERCANTIL, Apr. 29, 1977, at 6. Earnings on these investments de-
rived from the tax credits may not be remitted overseas; such funds may nonethe-
less be used to acquire from abroad capital equipment needed for the project.
This prohibition does not apply to fresh foreign currency investments by overseas
companies in EMBRAER, provided such investments are duly registered with the
appropriate governmental agencies. Decree Law 1563 ofJuly 29, 1977, art. 1, 41
LEX (Braz.) 551 (amending Decree Law 1376 of Dec. 12, 1974, art. 11, 38 LEX
(Braz.) 1153).
76 Indtstria Aerondutica: Ases [sic] da Ticnica, CACEX INFORMAgAO SEMANAL, Sept.
17, 1984, at 5 [hereinafter cited as Asas]. As Almir Medeiros, President of Aerotec
(a private firm) has said, "We thought [initially] we would come to statism. But
today, I believe that without EMBRAER a Brazilian aircraft industry would no
longer exist." EXAME, supra note 37, at 27.
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accrued to the public treasury, as opposed to the mixed-
economy scheme, where the bulk of the profits will enure
to private interests. The government planners, however,
were endeavoring to promote several other developmen-
tal objectives in addition to capitalizing on aircraft indus-
try. By structuring EMBRAER in this manner, the regime
displayed an ideological commitment to private capital-
ism 77 - even for a high risk venture like this where sub-
stantial technical and financial aid from the government
was indispensable for starting up the industry.
The use of the tax mechanism to elicit equity invest-
ments from the private sector can also be viewed as an-
other effort to help strengthen the securities market by
increasing the total number of issues available for public
sale. This approach further contributes to the goal of
"democratization of capital" by spreading the ownership
of these government sponsored projects among several
thousand shareholders. Finally, by compelling taxpayers
either to save in the form of these investments or to lose
the corresponding amounts in the form of taxes, tax de-
vices such as D.L. 15778 were intended to educate the
public. 79 After a period of such "forced savings,"80 it was
hoped that the public would have learned the value of
holding equities and would be disposed to invest their
own resources in other Brazilian shares.8 ' Once this les-
77 The loyalty of the Brazilian planners to the private sector is indicated not
only by the capitalization techniques used, but also by D.L. 770, which directs
EMBRAER "to the extent possible to carry out its projects indirectly through con-
tracts with private industry." D.L. 770, supra note 38, art. 2, § 1.
78 See supra note 60 and accompanying text for a discussion of D.L. 157.
79 Trubek, supra note 22, at 66-67.
8o Id. at 67.
at With the Brazilian economy booming and share prices increasing, the idea
seemed to work. Persons who had never purchased shares were using some of
their own funds to buy equities. The recent world recession, combined with Bra-
zil's US $100 billion foreign debt, of course, has had a dampening effect on the
nation's economy. So serious is this problem that international creditors have
released Brazil from amortization of its foreign debts during 1984. That agree-
ment has been extended pending conclusion of negotiations on the servicing of
her debt in 1985. Dallas Times Herald, Dec. 29, 1984 at 16A, col. 1. Neverthe-
less, the Brazilian public still considers equities of speculative interest and the
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son had been learned, the theory went, these special in-
centives could be eliminated. In fact, the D.L. 157
incentive device was recently terminated.82
Nonetheless, the use of tax incentives to promote in-
vestment does not produce unmixed blessings. Channel-
ing the country's limited resources into investments like
the Northeast region or EMBRAER diverts funds the gov-
ernment might otherwise have collected and used for
sorely needed social welfare projects, such as education,
public housing or medical care. Since Brazil has a gradu-
ated tax structure, the tax incentive route means the bene-
fits to wealthy taxpayers are disproportionately higher
than those for taxpayers in the middle and lower income
brackets.
For many years, this regressive effect was compounded
by the lack of an effective capital gains tax.83 Although in
1976, gains from the sale of stock became taxable,84 such
tax did not apply to shares either sold on the stock ex-
change8 5 nor to stocks which have been held more than
five years.86 EMBRAER shares are traded on the ex-
change; thus, it would not seem difficult for an EMBRAER
shareholder to avoid this tax.
stock markets continue to hum. Phone interview with Eugene Rostov, Baker &
McKenzie, Miami, Fla., May 7, 1985.
82 Decree Law 2065 of Oct. 26, 1983, art. 14, 47 LEX (Braz.) 441, 444 . Such
revocation was apparently motivated by a desire to control inflation. Pinheiro
Neto, Legal Letter, Oct., 1983, at 3. Brazil's inflation rate was 223 percent in
1984. Dallas Times Herald, Dec. 29, 1983, at 16A, col. 1. See infra note 89 for a
description of the techniques adopted by Brazil to cope with this inflation.
83 Trubek, supra note 22, at 68. This means that taxpayer/investors in the
Northeast, in EMBRAER, or other favored sectors received free of taxes both the
money represented by the original tax credit investment and the appreciation on
that investment.
84 Decree Law 1510 of Dec. 27, 1976, art. 1, 40 LEX (Braz.) 1021; see also
PINHEIRO, supra note 31, at §§ 14.117-.120 n.l.
85 Decree Law 1510, supra note 84, art. 4(a); see also PINHEIRO, supra note 31, at
§ 14.117-.120 n.3.




EMBRAER began distributing dividends as early as
1974,87 a year in which its net earnings reached 20% of
capital 8  (adjusted for inflation).89  The value of EM-
BRAER shares appreciated from Cr $0.85 in 1970 to Cr
$3.09 in 1976.90 By 1983, EMBRAER had made an an-
nual net profit of US $1.8 million on sales of US $219
million.9 1
3. Reinvestment
As described above, EMBRAER was legally obligated to
reinvest a portion of its earnings. By 1974, the company
had allocated Cr $44 million to research and, develop-
ment; this sum had grown to Cr $75 million in 1976.92
During the summer of 1984, the President of EMBRAER
indicated his firm was investing US $250 million in new
projects .
III. PRODUCTION OF EMBRAER
By 1970, EMBRAER had completed a sizeable factory
87 GAZETA MERCANTIL, Apr. 29, 1977, at 6.
88 Naturally, the earnings ratio has fluctuated. In 1975, the rate dropped to
18% and in 1976, to 17%. EXAME, supra note 37, at 26.
89 The Brazilian economy is widely indexed to account for inflation. Under the
concept known as "monetary correction," the law authorizes or requires indexing
of principal as well as interest on loans, writing up the value of fixed assets and
depreciation thereon, as well as making working capital and balance sheet adjus-
tents. Rosenn, Adjusting Taxation of Business Income for Inflation: Lessons from Brazil
and Chile, 13 TEx. INrr'L L.J. 165 (1978); Rosenn, Adaptations of the Brazilian Income
Tax to Inflation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 58 (1968); see also ROSENN, LAW AND INFLATION
(1982).
- GAZETA MERCANTIL, Apr. 29, 1977, at 6.
,it A Third World Plane Maker Targets the RAF, Bus. WK., June 18, 1983, at 37, 40.
At an earlier point, EMBRAER had been even more profitable, earning US $239
million in 1981. The Commuter Plane that Flies on Financing, Bus. WK., Apr. 12, 1982,
at 46. The world recession caused a downturn the next two years and by the end
of November 1983, it looked as if the company would suffer a small loss for the
year. GAZETA MERCANTIL, Dec. 29, 1983. The last minute sale, however, of five
planes to the United States for US $12 million reversed the situation and pro-
duced a profit for 1983. GAZETA MERCANTIL, Jan. 6, 1984.
92 ExAME, supra note 37, at 26.
93 GAZETA MERCANTIL, July 13, 1984, at 23.
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at Sdo Jose dos Campos near the city of Sao Paulo,94 and
had acquired a staff of 550 people.95 Today the company
has 7,300 employees96 and has vastly expanded its pro-
duction facilities. Technologically, the craft manufac-
tured by EMBRAER can be divided into two generations.
A. The First Generation
1. The Bandeirante
With 13097 Bandeirantes being flown by United States
airlines, obviously this model is the one of greatest inter-
est to American readers. The plane was designed to con-
front the difficulties inherent in Brazilian air transport at
the time. Many of the nation's landing fields were still un-
paved and short. There was also a need for a machine to
carry a few passengers over long distances.9 s
A twin engine turboprop, the Bandeirante can land or
take off in 2,000 feet over a fifty foot barrier.99 It can op-
erate on dirt runways and does not require a support
structure on the ground.'00 Among the 14 versions are
planes for military use, naval patrol, aerophotography,
and cargo hauling.' 0' The passenger version, initially
with nine to twelve seats, has been remodeled to carry 19
persons, plus crew. 0 2 [see page 584]. Four hundred and
Letter from J.R. Cheek, supra note 15.
9-1 0 V6o da EMBRAER, supra note 13, at 78.
96 Condom, supra note 8.
97 Ingersoll & Lowenstein, FAA Orders U.S. Carriers to Inspect Planes of Model In-
volved in PBA Crash, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 1983, at 5.
98 More than 200 Brazilian cities had lost air service within the preceding ten
years because no such craft existed. Brazil Herald (Rio dejaneiro), Mar. 3, 1971,
at IIB.
- Av. WK. & SPACE TEcH.,Jan. 11, 1971, at 62. Its maximum flying time is four
hours and forty minutes. The top speed is 560 kilometers per hour. 0 Vdo da
EMBRAER, supra note 13, at 78.
- EMBRAER: 15 Years of Daring, BANCO DO BRASIL, MONTHLY LETrER, Aug.
1984, at 4, 5.
lo, R. PEREIRA DE ANDRADE & A. PIOCHI, HIST6RIA DA CONSTRu .io AER-
ONAUTiCA NO BRASIL 265-72 (1982) [hereafter cited as ANDRADE]; BANCO DO BRA-
SIL, MONTHLY LETrER, Aug. 1984, at 4; Asas, supra note 76, at 6.
102 Brazil Herald (Rio deJaneiro), Mar. 3, 1971, at 1 IB; Asas, supra note 76, at
[50
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fifty Bandeirantes have now been produced. 11 3 The aver-
age price today for this plane is US $1.8 million. 10 4
2. Ipanema
Despite its vast territory devoted to farming, Brazil in
1970 had only 30 agricultural planes, 10 5 as compared to
5,000 in the United States or 500 in Mexico. 0 6 When dis-
ease struck the rice plantations in southern Brazil during
the late sixties, one half the nation's crop was lost because
only fifteen of the nation's crop dusters were in operating
condition. 107
The Ipanema is a single engine, one seater agricultural
plane designed for crop dusting, seeding and fertiliz-
ing.1°8 Built in conjunction with the private firm Aerotec
under subcontract with EMBRAER,10 9 more than 500
Ipanemas have been sold. The current price is around Cr
$177 million. Although this plane has been marketed
mainly in Brazil, a few have gone to Uruguay and
Bolivia. 110
3. The Xavante
The Xavante, known outside Brazil as the Aeromacchi
MB-326, was a small jet trainer fighter manufactured
under a US $53 million licensing and purchasing contract
signed in 1970 with Macchi, an Italian firm."' The first
jet constructed in Brazil, 170 Xavante were purchased by
the Brazilian Air Force. The Xavante has now been
phased out and the last one produced." 12
,03 SOUTH, June 1984, at 74.
- EMBRAER: 15 Years of Daring, BANCO DO BRASIL, MONTHLY LETrER, Aug.
1984, at 4.
l05 0 V6o da EMBRAER, supra note 13, at 78.
106 U.S. Dep't. State Airgram No. A 284 from Rio de Janeiro, June 8, 1970.
107 0 Vdo da EMBRAER, supra note 13, at 78.
108 Cheek, supra note 15.
,09 ANDRADE, supra note 101, at 257.
,10 Asas, supra note 76, at 6.
- ANDRADE, supra note 101, at 258.
112 North, EMBRAER Expands its Facilities for Two New Aircraft, Av. WK. & SPACE
TECH., Aug. 22, 1983, at 144.
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4. The Piper Agreement
Between 1970 and 1974, Brazil had imported 1,900
small planes at a cost of US $150 million in foreign ex-
change. It was estimated that if imports continued at this
rate, the country would be suffering an annual dollar out-
flow of US $500 million by 1977. Thus, the EMBRAER
officials decided they needed to involve a foreign manu-
facturer of small planes in their Brazilian operations. At
the same time, EMBRAER wished to avoid "technological
dependency"; the company did not want to become
merely an assembly plant.' 13
In 1974, EMBRAER and the Piper Aircraft Corporation
concluded an agreement, under which EMBRAER would
manufacture six Piper Models. Under the first stage of
that accord, Piper sent kits which EMBRAER simply as-
sembled and painted." 4 During subsequent stages, EM-
BRAER made some design changes and progressively
substituted Brazilian-made parts for the U.S. components.
By the end of 1978, all the parts were of Brazilian origin
except those whose local production would have been
"uneconomical because of the small number of units in-
volved."' "15 Piper also agreed to place its international
marketing network at EMBRAER's disposal, even for the
Brazilian planes EMBRAER had modified." 16
Under the Piper agreement, EMBRAER produces the
Navajo (Navajo Chieftain), the Seneca, the Minuano
(Cherokee Six), the Corisco (Arrow II), the Sertanejo, and
the Carioca (Pathfinder)." 7 This arrangement has al-
lowed Brazil to avoid importing a large number of planes
while at the same time giving EMBRAER experience with
quantity (and quality) production. By the end of 1984,
EMBRAER had produced 1,800 planes under the Piper
- EXAME, supra note 37, at 25.
114 ANDRADE, supra note 101, at 262.
115 Id.
1r EXAME, supra note 37, at 25.
17 ANDRADE, supra note 101, at 262; Asas, supra note 76, at 6.
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B. The Second Generation
1. The Brasilia
A twin engine pressurized turboprop for 30 passengers,
the Brasilia has a low noise level and is credited with ex-
cellent passenger comfort. The executive version which
will carry 12 passengers will be capable of crossing the
Atlantic. Flying at 500 kmh, i" 9 it is the fastest plane in its
class.' 20 Joseph Clark, President of Horizon Airlines, said
the Brasilia "is beautifully made, and it is one of the nic-
est-looking commuter aircraft under development."' 2'
[see page 585]
EMBRAER has devoted US $160 million to the devel-
opment of this plane,122 which sells for US $4.82 million
at 1984 values. Certification of airworthiness by the Bra-
zilian authorities should have been achieved by the end of
1984, to be followed shortly by the United States FAA
certification. 23  EMBRAER expects to reach the
breakeven point when the 120th plane is sold. 124 By the
end of November 1984 there were 27 firm orders for the
Brasilia and options with paid deposits for another 90.125
Condom, supra note 8, at 1339-40.
"9 BANCO DO BRASIL, MONTHLY LETrER, Aug. 1984, at 4. The Brasilia uses Pratt
& Whitney of Canada PW 115 turboprop engines. Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., May 8,
1983, at 28.
120 The airframe is guaranteed for 24 months, the landing gear for 24 months
or 6,000 landings, and the on-board system for 12 months. The overhaul life of
its Pratt & Whitney engines has been set at 2,500 hours initially, but it is expected
to rise to 6,000 hours within five years. The engine is warranted for 1,000 hours
or six months and the manufacturer will reimburse between 50 and 100% of the
cost of any necessary modifications of the craft and of all modification directives
issued by airworthiness authorities. Condom, supra note 8, at 1343.
121 North, EMBRAER Flies EMB-120 Prior to Rollout, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH.,
Aug. 8, 1983, at 28.
122 Asas, supra note 76, at 6.
123 Condom, supra note 8, at 1343.
12- de Faro, Bandeirante Para Todos as Bandeiras, COMtRCIO & MERCADOS, Aug.
1980, at 36.
125 Condom, supra note 8, at 1343. Certification will also be sought from the
British CAA and the French DGAC. With these certifications, the plane will be
marketable worldwide. ANDRADE, supra note 101, at 317.
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2. The Xingu
Brazil's first pressurized plane, the Xingu is a twin en-
gine turboprop for executive use capable of carrying eight
persons. With a complete system of electronic com-
mands, including automatic pilot, it has been chosen for
the training of pilots for large commercial and military
jets. The unit price is US $2.2 million. 26 Between 1976
and 1982, EMBRAER manufactured 57 Xingus.127
3. The Tucano
A single engine turboprop for basic military training,
the Tucano is the first plane of its category to be specifi-
cally designed for this purpose. In addition to an ejection
seat, it is equipped with a number of innovations that rank
it ahead of similar models available on the market. 2 8
With a basic cost of US $1.2 million, it is being produced
at a rate of six per month. By June 1984, fifty of these
planes had been delivered. 29 [See page 586].
4. The AM-X
A subsonic military jet, the Am-X with a top speed of
1,100 kmh can handle tactical and attack missions. Mod-
ern electronic equipment makes radar detection diffi-
cult' 30 and its wings are resistant to bullet penetration.' 3'
It will use Rolls Royce 807 engines, manufactured in Italy
by Fiat under license from the British firm. 32 Selling at
"2; Asas, supra note 76, at 6. It has a speed of 480 kph and a flight autonomy of
2.260 Km. BANCO DO BRASIL, MONTHLY LETTER, Aug. 1984, at 5.
127 ANDRADE, supra note 101, at 315.
,28 BANCO DO BRASIL, MONTHLY LETTER, Aug. 1984, at 4. This two seat trainer
can perform light attack missions with four underwing hard points, for a total
weapons load of 1,300 lb. It can carry two machine gun pods with 350 rounds
each or four MK 81 250 lb. bombs or four rocket pods. The radius of the T-17
versions with two MK 81 bombs is about 440 nautical miles. Id.
'2' Asas, supra note 76, at 6.
,, The Am-X can carry 3,600 kg. under its wings. BANCO DO BRASIL, MONTHLY
LETTER, Aug. 1984, at 4.
1., Am-X: Asas do Brasil No Subs6nico Binacional, TENDPNCIA, Dec. 1983, at 14
[hereinafter cited as Am-X].
142 Id.
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US $10 million, the Am-X is half the price of its
competitors. 133
This plane is being developed jointly with two Italian
companies. EMBRAER has a 30% share in the produc-
tion, Aeritalia a 48% share and Aeromacchi the remain-
der. 134 By the end of 1983, it had not yet been decided
whether these three companies would market Am-X
jointly or separately. 135
Plans call for 187 of these fighters for the Italian Air
Force and 79 for the Brazilian Air Force. 136 Deliveries
were to have begun in 1986,137 but in May 1984 the first
prototype crashed. Although the damage was covered by
insurance, the partners must decide whether to delay their
program by building a replacement or to push ahead with
the later prototype. 138
5. A Helicopter?
In 1984, EMBRAER held talks with the U.S. company
Sikorsky concerning a possible license to manufacture
helicopters in Brazil.' 39 This proposal is being vigorously
opposed by Helibras, 140 the nation's only helicopter man-
13 Latin American Markets, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), No. 90, at 5 (Aug. 27,
1984).
,14 North, EMBRAER Expands its Facilities for Two New Aircraft, Av. WK. & SPACE
TECH., Aug. 22, 1983, at 144.
,35 Am-X, supra note 131, at 14.
136 Id.
157 Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Sept. 6, 1982, at 143.
-8' Latin American Markets, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), No. 88, at 5 (July 30,
1984).
139 Choer, A PortaJd Estd Aberta Para Produzir No Brasil, Diz Sikorsky, GAZETA MER-
CANTIL, Apr. 7, 1984; Reis, EMBRAER Confirma Negocia jes, GAZETA MERCANTIL,
Apr. 7, 1984.
140 Soon after the founding of EMBRAER, Brazil tried to develop a helicopter
industry to satisfy national needs. Since EMBRAER was otherwise preoccupied, it
did not participate in this operation, which resulted in formation of a Brazilian
company, Helibras, whose shares were 45% owned by the State of Minas Gerais (a
state within Brazil), 45% by a French concern, Abrospatiale, and 10% by a com-
pany called Aerfoto. ANDRADE, supra note 101, at 279. Helibras now employs 200
people and has produced some fifty-eight helicopters since its creation in 1980.
Nine machines have been purchased by the Brazilian Navy, and forty-seven by
Brazilian civil operators. Condom, supra note 8.
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ufacturer, on the ground that the internal market cannot
support two producers. 141 Although some expect the
venture to go forward, 142 others believe the Sikorsky ne-
gotiations are just a ploy to pressure the French partner in
Helibras to use more Brazilian-made components in its
machines. 143
IV. EMBRAER'S TECHNOLOGY
A. Importation of Technology
The EMBRAER officials recognized that it would be
technically and financially impractical to try to build an
airplane from scratch. Hence in their 1970 contract with
Aeromacchi, the Brazilians acquired not only a license to
produce the Xavante, but also a commitment from the
Italian company to furnish technical assistance over the
next ten years for the production of the Bandeirante and
the other types of equipment. 144 Likewise, Cessna, an
American company, contributed to the technology of the
Ipanema. 145
In addition to the AM-X and the Piper agreements de-
scribed above, EMBRAER signed a contract in 1983 with
Sikorsky to transfer technology on the production of com-
posite materials which are used on external surfaces of the
plane in place of aluminum. 46
All contracts transferring foreign technology to Brazil
must be previously approved by the National Institute of
Industrial Property within the Ministry of Industry and
,4, Magalh~es, Helibrds: Mercado Ndo Comporta Duas Empresas, GAZETA MERCANTIL,
Apr. 7, 1984.
142 Latin American Markets, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), July 30, 1984, No. 88, at
5.
, The contract made with the French company called for the gradual substitu-
tion of foreign parts with Brazilian-made components. ANDRADE, supra note 101,
at 280.
144 U.S. Dep't. State Airgram No. A 284 From Rio De Janeiro, June 8, 1970.
"1 Interview withJames R. Cheek, Transportation officer, American Embassy in
Rio deJaneiro (June 3, 1971).
146 Asas, supra note 76, at 14. These composite materials may be used to con-
struct the doors, the engine nacelles, flaps and other control surfaces of the
Brasilia. Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Aug. 22, 1983, at 144.
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Commerce (INPI).' 47 In an additional effort to conserve
foreign exchange, the INPI in 1983 issued Normative Act
No. 32 requiring the local companies requesting such a
transfer to "justify the need for the foreign technology,
[and] the choice of the supplier on the basis of a technical
and economic study comparing the foreign technology
and supplier with other available technologies and suppli-
ers. ... "8 Moreover, Normative Act No. 68 of January
17, 1984 now requires government entities to consult
with INPI prior to issuing invitations to bid whenever for-
eign technology may be involved.' 49 Even though EM-
BRAER is an important earner of foreign exchange, it has
encountered some difficulty in satisfying these new
requirements.
Besides licensing agreements with foreign companies,
EMBRAER has opted to import many component parts
directly. Approximately 70 percent of EMBRAER's com-
ponents parts are imported, 50 including 1200 Pratt &
Whitney (Canadian) engines, which power most of the
EMBRAER planes.' 5' D.L. 770 facilitates such imports by
exempting EMBRAER from customs duties on imports of
raw materials, parts, components, equipment or other ma-
,, Normative Act No. 15 of Sept. 11, 1975, issued by INPI in the Ministry of
Industry and Commerce (Brazil), (translated and reprinted in AMERICAN BAR
Ass'N, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: LAWS AND PRACTISE IN LATIN AMERICA 283, (B.
Carl ed. rev. ed. 1980) [hereinafter TRANSFER LAws]. These regulations limit or
prohibit a variety of contractual clauses typically found in licensing agreements,
i.e., restrictions on exports, obligatory grant-back clauses, tied purchase arrange-
ments, post-contract restrictions, no attack clauses, etc. See, Nattier, Brazil,
TRANSFER LAws, Id., at 145.
Normative Act No. 67 of Dec. 29, 1983, provides for the forfeiture of trade-
marks and patents if they are not used. Industrial Property Review No. 692, Jan.
24, 1984, as cited in Pinheiro Neto, Legal Letter, Jan. 24, 1984, at 5.
148 Industrial Property Review No. 680, Nov. 1, 1983, as cited in Pinheiro Neto,
Legal Letter, Nov. 1983, at 2. In Normative Act No. 26 of Nov. 8, 1983, the Office
of "Informatics" (Computers) has instituted a List of Informatics Supplier Com-
panies. To sell to Brazilian government agencies or entities, foreign suppliers
must now be registered on that list. The list covers, for example, storage disks,
tapes and other data processing equipment and supplies. Pinheiro Neto, Legal
Letter, Nov. 1983, at 1.
149 DOU-1,Jan. 13, 1984, as cited in Pinheiro Neto, Legal Letter, Jan. 1984, at 4.
150 Asas, supra note 76, at 9.
'' Id. at 11. The engines cost EMBRAER US $160 million. Id.
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chinery, 52 so long as no "similar" product is made in
Brazil. 5 3
The decision to import such a large percentage of parts
was justified on several grounds. First, by relying mainly
on the Pratt & Whitney motors, EMBRAER reduced ex-
penses through standardization. 54 Next, if EMBRAER
had tried to use only Brazilian-made parts, the high per
unit cost resulting from low volume production would
have significantly pushed up the price of the finished
products. For example, the Bandeirante which now sells
for US $1.8 million would have cost an estimated US $3
million. Finally, to sell the planes at home and abroad,
air-worthiness certificates have to be obtained from the
domestic and foreign governmental agencies concerned
with air safety; satisfying their various requirements man-
dates the use of highest quality components. 55
Even with the large portion of imported components,
the local cost component of EMBRAER's finished product
runs around 75%.156 This is because aircraft manufactur-
ing is a labor intensive business calling for careful piece-
by-piece hand assembly. Consequently, skilled labor ac-
counts for between 40% and 80% of the final cost. 157
EMBRAER is nevertheless trying to shift an ever in-
creasing portion of its component purchasing to local
suppliers to the extent this can be done without hurting
its competitiveness on the world market.158 Moreover, the
15 D.L. 770, supra note 38, art. 15.
,53 Decree Law 37 of Nov. 18, 1966, 30 LEX (Braz.) 1636. Article 18 of that
Decree Law established three basic criteria that must be considered in determin-
ing whether a Brazilian product should be treated as "similar": (a) price not above
the cruzeiro cost of importing a similar foreign product, calculated on the basis of
"normal price" plus all taxes and fees incident to the importation; (b) normal
delivery time currently in effect for similar merchandise; and (c) equivalent quality
and adequate specifications. Id.
15, Successes and Constraints, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), May 19, 1983, at XlI.
155 Asas, supra note 76, at 10.
156 Id.
151 Id. Labor represents 75% of the final cost of the Bandeirante, 40% of the
Xavante, 80% of the Ipanema, 70% of the Xingu, and 40-45% of the Piper air-
craft. EXAME, supra note 37, at 25.
158 Asas, supra note 76, at 9, 10.
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existence of this major industry has already had a multi-
plier effect within the Brazilian economy. More than 300
Brazilian companies are producing parts for EM-
BRAER.159 Under subcontracts, Aerotec is building the
Ipanema fuselage.' 60 EMBRAER and other Brazilian
firms are producing alarm systems and view finders for
the Tucano.161 Electronic equipment is being furnished
by a local company which is associated with Collins, the
U.S. concern. 62 EMBRAER hopes that ultimately it can
act as a spearhead to open up the international market for
the products of some of its local suppliers. Finally, Brazil-
ian firms are exploring the possibility of producing parts
for the AM-X Rolls engine in a venture with Fiat of
Brazil. 163
B. Appropriate Technology
With the publication in 1973 of E.F. Schumacher's pace
setting book, Small Is Beautiful'" it became fashionable
to talk about "appropriate" technology. Failure to de-
velop technology suitable for local needs or to make
greater use of Third World technicians was criticized.' 65
By 1980, more than 1,000 organizations had been estab-
lished to work in the field of appropriate technology. 66
As far back as 1971, President Silva of EMBRAER
thought he had perceived a niche in the international air-
craft industry which Brazil could occupy. As he then said:
More than 100 countries from the so-called Third World
need airplanes appropriate to their commercial short and
159 EXAME, supra note 37, at 27.
1 6 Id.
16, Asas, supra note 76, at 11.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 11-12.
64 In fact, he proposes for these intermediate technology companies a system
of mixed public and private ownership not dissimilar to the EMBRAER pattern. E.
SCHUMACHER, SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL 284-92 (Perennial Libr. ed. 1975).
165 See, e.g., D. GOULET, THE UNCERTAIN PROMISE: VALUE CONFLICTS IN TECH-
NOLOGY TRANSFER 174-76 (1977).
-6 N. JEQUIER & G. BLANC, THE WORLD OF APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY 9
(OECD, 1982). This book contains a description of those various institutions.
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medium traffic density. The large aeronautical companies,
i.e. the airplane industry, do not produce machines of this
type. In addition, there is a need for a tough aircraft suita-
ble for bad fields in the Third World countries. This is a
Bandeirante market. . 167
Subsequent history proved these words prophetic - ex-
cept for not foreseeing the opportunities soon to unfold
in the industrialized world as well. When the first petro-
leum crisis hit in 1973, many enterprises were forced to
substitute fuel efficient turboprops for their high con-
sumption jets. This gave the Bandeirante a chance to
prove itself a solid workhorse in climates ranging from
Alaska to Africa. 68
When the United States decided in the late seventies to
deregulate the airline industry, 69 a new market for small
commuter aircraft arose. D. Ekedahl, President of the Re-
gional Airlines Association, claims.that although millions
of passengers are carried by such lines, the American
manufacturers have chosen "not to enter the growing
marketplace for small commercial transport. .. ,,70 Here
then was another gap for the Bandeirante and Brasilia to
fill.
When President Silva of EMBRAER was asked if his
company could compete with the VFW-Fokker in the in-
ternal Brazilian market, he answered affirmatively, point-
ing out that the Brasilia (as well as the Bandeirante) can
operate on air strips shorter than 700 meters, some of
which still exist in Brazil.' 7 1 In contrast, the Fokker with
its high wings requires a much longer landing distance. 172
Even the high tech Am-X may be considered "appropri-
167 Brazil Herald, Mar. 3, 1971, at I IB, col. 3.
- Asas, supra note 76, at 5.
,- The last vestiges- of regulation ended on December 31, 1984, when the Civil
Aeronautics Board finally wound up and closed down pursuant to the 1978 Air-
line Deregulation Act. Videotex, AP Wire, Dec. 31, 1984, EST 12:00 at p. APV
2252.
o70 Gama Predicts Low Aircraft Export Levels, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 4, 1982,
at 24.
71 Dias, supra note 6, at 27-28.
172 Id. at 28.
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ate" technology. Silva claims a substantial portion of mili-
tary missions are carried out at the subsonic level and
that, for aerodynamic reasons, supersonic planes operate
inefficiently at these lower levels.' 73 In contrast, a sub-
sonic jet, like the Am-X, could perform the same tasks and
would cost a third as much as the existing supersonics.
While the Am-X is "not a panacea," Silva concludes it will
be "the most efficient plane for 60 to 70% of the military
missions any air force carries Out.' '1 74
Thus, it seems that EMBRAER with its little, sturdy
planes is filling practical needs both in the developing
countries and the industrialized nations. This would seem
to give real meaning to the term "appropriate"
technology.
V. DEVELOPMENT OF MARKETS
A. The Internal Brazilian Market
Although EMBRAER started with a cushion of guaran-
teed sales to the Brazilian Air Force of 80 Bandeirantes,1 75
the company avoided the mistake, often made by coun-
tries starting a new aircraft industry, of relying almost ex-
clusively on home military orders. Rather, EMBRAER
maintained from the start a balance between military and
civilian business. 176 After a successful decade, the com-
pany did embark on the Brasilia project without any as-
sured military sales;' 77 now, however, it is reported that
the Air Force has taken an option on 26 Brasilias.178
To develop the Brazilian market, the government has
173 Am-X, supra note 131, at 13.
174 Id.
175 ANDRADE, supra note 101, at 265; Buying a Brand-New Aircraft Industry, Bus.
WK., Mar. 17, 1970, at 46. Ultimately, the Brazilian Air Force took 100 of these
planes, which they use for troop transport, rescue missions and patrol. BANCO DO
BRAsIL, MONTHLY LETrER, May 1982, at 3.
176 Condom, supra note 8, at 1340.
177 Latin American Markets, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), July 30, 1984, No. 88, at
5. Silva characterized this as a "terrific gamble which could have been the ruin of
the company." He added, "I spent many sleepless nights .... Fortunately, my
fears were groundless. The Brasilia is proving a huge success." Id.
178 Condom, supra note 8, at 1343.
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followed a calculated policy of opening and then closing
the gates to small foreign planes. For example, to stimu-
late the use of agricultural aircraft, a 1970 law exempted
such planes from customs duties.179 Imports of single and
twin engine planes rose from about 100 in 1970 to over
500 in 1974.180 Then as EMBRAER's production begin to
kick in during 1974, the tariff on small craft was increased
by 50%.181 In addition, the President of Brazil decreed
that any importation of civil aircraft or parts thereof must
receive prior approval of the Aviation Ministry's Coordi-
nating Committee for Civil Air Transport. That Commit-
tee, in making such a decision, was obligated "to take into
account .. .the existence of domestic production [and
the need to] substitute such manufactures for the airships
sought to be imported, as well as the purpose for which
such craft is to be used."'' 8 2 Statistics indicate that these
measures were indeed effective. By 1977, small plane an-
nual imports had dropped to less than fifty units while
sales of domestically produced craft climbed to more than
550. 183
The economic difficulties caused by the world reces-
sion, high oil prices and rising foreign debt, eventually
came to affect EMBRAER's sales within the Brazilian mar-
ket. For example, in 1976 the company produced over
100 Ipanemas; by 1979, that figure dropped to zero; and
by 1983, it had climbed back up to only sixteen. Of the
Piper line planes, one thousand were manufactured in the
1976-77 period; in contrast, the 1983 figure was 128
179 Law 5618 of Nov. 3, 1970, 34 LEX (Braz.) 1039.
180 Dias, supra note 6, at 28.
18, EXAME, supra note 37, at 24. See also Decree 86,010 of May 15, 1981, art. 7,
45 LEX (Braz.) 172.
182 Decree 74,219 ofJune 25, 1974, arts. 1-2. That Decree was issued under the
authorization conferred upon the President by art. 55 (II) of the Brazilian Consti-
tution.
These restrictions were further tightened in 1981 by a decree requiring ap-
proval of both the Ministry of Agriculture and the Civil Air Transport Committee
to import agricultural planes. Decree 86,765 of Dec. 22, 1981, art. 22, 45 LEX
(Braz.) 716.
183 Dias, supra note 6, at 28.
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units. 84 More than half of EMBRAER's recent sales have
come from outside the country. 8 5 By mid 1984, not a sin-
gle Brasilia had been sold to a local company, largely be-
cause all of the country's airlines were in financial
trouble. 8 6
These same conditions created problems for Brazil's
private producers of aircraft. By the mid-seventies, Neiva
was hurt by rising costs combined with defects in one of
its airship models. Compounding this situation was a re-
duction in subcontracts from EMBRAER, whose own do-
mestic market was decreasing. After a 1979
reorganization of Neiva failed, in 1980 EMBRAER
purchased 100% of Neiva's common stock. 187 Although
still a separate legal entity, Neiva today is managed as a
division of EMBRAER. The Piper line and the Ipanema
are now being manufactured at the former Neiva fac-
tory. 88 This produced a shift in orders away from an-
other private firm, Aerotec, forcing that company to lay
off 200 persons.'8 9
Despite these very real difficulties, Americans are com-
plaining about Brazil's protectionism in this industry. On
the other hand, it can be pointed out that Brazilian
purchases of U.S. aircraft, parts and equipment far out-
weigh her sales to the U.S. 190 Finally, Boeing, Piper and
- Nery, Gigantismo, Dilema da EMBRAER, 0 ESTADO DE SAo PAULO, Aug. 5,
1984, at 20.
185 Successes and Contraints, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), May 19, 1983, at XII.
,11 Latin American Markets, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), July 30, 1984, No. 88, at
5.
'87 ANDRADE, supra note 101, at 283-87.
188 Av. WK. & SPACE TECH. 23 (1984); North, EMBRAER Expands Its Facilities for
Two New Aircraft, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Aug. 22, 1983, at 144.
-9 ANDRADE, supra note 101, at 289. In mid summer 1984, however, Aerotec
was negotiating with an Italian group, Siai Marchetti, on a possible joint venture
to produce a military observation plane and an amphibious craft. The transaction
depended upon a guaranty by the Brazilian Aviation Minister to buy a minimum
number of planes. EMBRAER said it would not oppose the arrangement, that it
did not wish to be a monopoly and that the proposed craft do not directly com-
pete with EMBRAER's products. Stefani, Aerotec e Siai Marchetti Chegam a Acordo
sobre Producqdo no Brasil, GAZETA MERCANTIL, July 12, 1984.
90 In a recent three year period, the United States sales of these goods were six
times as much as Brazil's sales to the U.S. Brazil: Trade Troubles Strain Relations With
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other American component makers, whose products ac-
count for 40% of the Bandeirante's cost, defend the
Brazilians. '9'
In the long run, Silva is optimistic about the prospects
of Brazil's internal market. He says the country needs
20,000 small planes to cover its territory adequately, and
today there are only 6,000.192 At present, the Brazilian
economy cannot generate credit internally for purchases
of these planes. Thus, EMBRAER is exploring the possi-
bility of obtaining external financing for this purpose.
One suggestion would involve selling the craft to foreign
companies which, in turn, would lease them back to other
Brazilian firms. 93 By reducing the initial cash outlay, the
leasing approach would benefit local concerns suffering
working capital shortages. Brazilian law now permits leas-
ing and provides favorable tax treatment for foreign les-
sors.194 Lease-back arrangements have already become
the U.S., Bus. WK., Sept. 13, 1982, at 46. In 1979, the Minister of Aviation author-
ized the importation of one VFW-Fokker for every three Bandeirantes in opera-
tion. Dias, supra note 6, at 28. This may have been a response to the
"protectionism" charge.
-9 Brazil: The Commuter Plane that Flies on Financing, Bus. WK., Apr. 12, 1982, at
46.
191 Camargo, Como EMBRAER Ganhou o Mercado, Gazeta Mercantil, Aug. 30,
1984, at 1.
193 EMBRAER: 0 Successo de um Piano de V6o, REVISTA DAS CAMARAS ARGENTINAS
DE COMERCIO DO RIO DE JANEIRO E SAO PAULO, Nov. - Dec. 1982, at 21.
- In 1974, Brazil passed a law regulating leases. Law 6099 of September 12,
1974, 38 Lex (Braz.) 926. Under article 7 thereof, leasing operations are now
subject to control and inspection by the Central Bank of Brazil. To qualify under
the 1974 law, several conditions have to be satisfied. The leasing contract may be
entered into only between two legal entities and for the sole use of the lessee. Id.
art. 1. The lessor company must be authorized by the Central Bank to effect such
operations. Id. art. 2; Central Bank Resolution 351 of Nov. 17, 1975, as cited in J.
ARA6JO, INVESTMENTS IN BRAZIL: BASIC LEGAL ASPECTS 59 (5 ed. 1981) [hereinaf-
ter ARA6jo] The lessor must be given the right to terminate the lease either by
acquiring the goods, returning the goods, or renewing the contract. The duration
may not be less than three years. Id. at 60 (citing Resolution 351 of 1975, art. 8).
For tax purposes, the lessee may deduct the lease payments as an expense. Law
6099 of Sept. 12, 1974, art. 11, 38 LEX (Braz.) 926. Such payments are treated as
operating income to the lessor. The normal withholding tax of 25% on profits
remitted abroad may be reduced to between 2.5% and 5% of the payments to
foreign lessors. ARA6JO, supra this note, at 61. Law 7132 of Oct. 26, 1983, 47 LEX




popular outside Brazil; it is estimated that for regional air-
lines the ratio of leases to sales exceeds 50 percent.1 95
B. The International Market
1. Sales
EMBRAER first exported airplanes in 1975 when it sold
five Bandeirantes and ten Ipanemas to Uruguay, 96 but
the great breakthrough occurred in 1977 when the plane
was purchased by Air Littoral in France. 9 7 Today 250
Bandeirantes 198 are flying in 26 countries on five
continents. 199
Growing overseas sales prompted the company to cre-
ate two foreign subsidiaries. 20  EMBRAER Aviation In-
ternational, located in Le Bourget (Paris, France), acts as
a sales and service representative. In 1980, EMBRAER
Aircraft Corporation was formed as a Florida subsidiary to
sell aircraft, supply parts, and train pilots and mechan-
ics. 2Ot EMBRAER's marketing techniques were so suc-
cessful that by 1983 the Bandeirante accounted for 45%
of the American market for planes in its class.20 2
EMBRAER's foreign sales, however, have not been lim-
ited to the Bandeirante or the Ipanema. Ten Xavantes
have been sold to Argentina; 20 3 Paraguay and Togo have
each purchased six of these planes.20 4 Over 100 Xingus'
195 Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Dec. 2, 1984, at 45.
196 Stefani, Empresdrio Privado, Quis Chega aos 15 Anos, GAZETA MERCANTIL, Aug.
20, 1984.
197 Asas, supra note 76, at 12.
198 SOUTH, June 1984, at 74.
199 GAZETA MERCANTIL, July 8, 1984.
200 Article 2 of Decree 71,616, supra note 43, empowers EMBRAER to establish
"branches, offices, or agencies .. .abroad .... "
2.o Asas, supra note 76, at 12; Indtistria Aerondutica em Cu de Brigadeiro, BOLETIM
BANCO DO BRASIL, June-Apr. 1981, at 6.
202 EMBRAER: 0 Sucesso de um Plano de V6o, REVISTA DAS CAMARAS ARGENTINAS
DE COMERCIO DO Rio DEJANEIRO E SAO PAULO, Nov. - Dec. 1983, at 21.
203 FINANCIAL TIMES (London), May 19, 1983, at XII.
204 North, EMBRAER Expands Its Facilities for Two New Aircraft, Av. WK. & SPACE
TECH., Aug. 22, 1983, at 144.
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have been sold to nations as diverse as Nigeria,20 5 Saudi
Arabia, Belgium, and the United Kingdom. 2 6  The
French Air Force and Navy are using the Xingu for pilot
training.207 Other Latin American nations have
purchased fifty Tucanos 20 8 and EMBRAER has signed a
joint venture accord with Egypt to produce 120 of that
model. 20 9 The United Kingdom is considering a compara-
ble partnership.2 10
In 1984, EMBRAER sold ten Brasilias each to
Provincetown Boston Airlines 21' and Atlantic Southwest
Airlines, two regional U.S. carriers. In late May, it sold
four to Herson Airlines and two to PLM, Inc., an aircraft
leasing company.212 EMBRAER is currently negotiating
potential sales of Brasilias with the People's Republic of
China,213 Australia, Belgium and Finland.2 14 If all the ex-
isting options are exercised, EMBRAER's productive ca-
pacity will be fully utilized until the end of 1988.215
EMBRAER's exports totaled US $83 million in 1983216
and are expected to reach US $100 million in 1984.217
Brazil's foreign debt problems, however, are prompting
EMBRAER to explore the possibilities of countertrade,
for example, exchanging components for aircraft.218
205 North, GAMA Forecasts Slight Delivery Gain, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Jan. 31,
1983, at 67.
206 ANDRADE, supra note 101, at 315.
207 North, Manufacturers Set to Offer New Design, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Mar. 12,
1984, at 261.
208 Asas, supra note 76, at 6.
2 ourH, June 1984, at 74.
210 A Third World Plane Maker Targets the RAF, Bus. WK.,June 18, 1984 at 37, 40.
211 This airline recently filed for bankruptcy. Phone interview with Eugene Ros-
tov, Baker & MacKenzie, Miami, Fla., May 8, 1985. Thus, the status of this order
is not clear at the time of this writing.
212 Latin American Markets, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), July 30, 1984, No. 88, at
5; A Third World Plane Maker Targets the RAF, Bus. WK., June 18, 1984, at 40.
213 ESTADO DE Sio PAULO, July 13, 1984, at 23.
214 Stefani, Austrdlia, Be7gica, Finldndia e Fran a Podem Comprar o Brasdia, GAZETA
MERCANTIL, June 20, 1984, at 9.
2'1 Latin American Markets, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), July 30, 1984, No. 88, at
5.
216 Exportaqdes da EMBRAER, ESTADO Do SAo PAULO, Jan. 18, 1984.
217 Asas, supra note 76, at 8.
218 Id. at 11.
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2. FAA Certification
If EMBRAER were to sell its products to the United
States, the company would have to obtain a Certificate of
Air Worthiness from the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion. 2 1 9 Although satisfying the technical requirements of
the governmental air safety agencies in key industrialized
nations imposes a substantial cost on EMBRAER, this
step is considered essential by her officers.22 0
Brazilians contend that they were subjected to a "Catch
22" situation by the FAA for three years after their first
certification request. The FAA allegedly refused to ex-
pend resources examining the Bandeirante because no
Americans had ordered one, indicating that there was no
U.S. interest in the craft. But without FAA certification,
what American would order it? Finally, a U.S. company
did buy one. The impasse was resolved, and certification
was granted in 1978.2
3. Brazilian Export Incentives
a. Credit, Guaranties, and Insurance
For many years, almost all of the industrialized nations
have provided financing, loan guaranties and insurance to
2" Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1423(c) (1982).
22o Asas, supra note 76, at 9. For instance, Colonel Silva has commented on the
stringent requirements the Brasilia must meet under the new U.S. Federal Avia-
tion Regulations, Part 25, aimed at planes in the commuter markets. Clearly, EM-
BRAER can not risk developing a machine that might be denied FAA
Certification. Dias, supra note 6, at 24-25.
22 Asas, supra note 76, at 5, 12-13. At one point EMBRAER modified the
Bandeirante (into the EMB-11 OP.2) to conform to the new requirements of Spe-
cial Federal Aviation Regulations (SFAR) No. 41, Av. L. REP. § 8125, p. 4048
(1982), as issued 44 Fed. Reg. 53,723 (1979), amended 45 Fed. Reg. 25,046 (1980),
45 Fed. Reg. 80,973 (1980) and 47 Fed. Reg. 35,153 (1982). See also, ANDRADE,
supra note 101, at 312.
In the late seventies, EMBRAER began work on a pressurized version of the
Bandeirante. Ultimately, this project was abandoned because the demands of
SFAR 41 would not permit the sale of a pressurized Bandeirante for more than a
few years. Hence the company has decided to put its efforts into improving the
existing Bandeirante models and pushing forward on the pressurized Brasilia.
North, EMBRAER Expands Its Facilities for Two New Aircraft, Av. WK. & SPACE
TECH., Aug. 22, 1983, at 146; Condom, supra note 8, at 1342.
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promote exports.222 Typically, such insurance covers the
political risks of expropriation, inconvertibility of cur-
rency and war, revolution or insurrection. In the United
States, these incentives are administered by the Export-
Import Bank (Eximbank).22 8
Several developing countries have followed suit. For
more than a decade, the Brazilian Government through
CACEX (the Foreign Trade Department of the Bank of
Brazil) has offered exporters insurance against political
risks,224 as well as a wide range of financing alterna-
tives. 225 Export credits, administered by FINEX (the Ex-
port Financing Fund), may take the form of direct
financing, loans to foreign importers of Brazilian goods,
below-market financing to manufacturers for production
of export goods, and funds for market research and
development.22 6
The subsidized interest rates on' FINEX loans seldom
exceed 8%.227 Although a cash deposit of 15% is nor-
mally required for FINEX credit, EMBRAER hopes to
persuade the government to reduce the down payment to
'2 These programs are described in ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERA-
TION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE EXPORT CREDIT FINANCING SYSTEMS OF OECD MEM-
BER COUNTRIES (1982).
223 See Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 635(b)(1)(a)
(1982); see also W. STRENG, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS: TAX AND
LEGAL HANDBOOK 67 (1978).
224 B. CARL, A GUIDE TO INCENTIVES FOR INVESTING IN BRAZIL 41 (1972); see also
Law 6704 of Oct. 26, 1979, 43 LEX (Braz.) 835.
225 Decree Law 5025 ofJune 10, 1966, art. 60, 30 LEX (Braz.) 846 (1966); Cen-
tral Bank Resolution 398 of Dec. 22, 1976, No. 330 of July 16, 1975, and No. 329
ofJune 16, 1975, as cited in BANCO DE BRASIL, SUMMARY OF THE INVESTMENT LEGIS-
LATION IN BRAZIL 61, 64-65 nn. 22-26 (1980).
226 PINHEIRO, supra note 31, at § 6.127. Brazilian law also authorizes export
"trading companies." Decree Law 1248 of Nov. 29, 1972, 36 LEX (Braz.) 1512.
Inspired by the Japanese model of "sogo shosha," these companies act as in-
termediaries between buyers and sellers to facilitate the movement of goods and
to develop foreign markets. Such companies enjoy a number of tax exemptions
and reductions. Decree Law 1721 of Dec. 3, 1979, art. 3, 43 LEx (Braz.) 929;
TEBECHRANI, supra note 62, 327-39. For a comparison with the U.S. version of
trading companies, see the Export Trading Company Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-290,
96 Stat. 1233 (Oct. 6, 1982) and Norton, The Efficacy of Export Trading Companies and
Related Legislation and Regulations, 50 J. AIR L. & COM. 865 (1985).
227 PINHEIRO, supra note 31, at § 6.129 n.l.'
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10% and to stretch the finance period to ten years,22 8 at
least for the Brasilia.
b. Tax Incentives for Exports
Nations have also manipulated their tax structures in an
attempt to increase exports. The DISC (Domestic Inter-
national Sales Corporation) 229, recently replaced by the
FSC (Foreign Sales Corporation),230 furnishes an example
of such effort by the United States. Brazil has created a
plethora of similar tax incentives for exports.
i. Corporate Income Tax
Exporters of manufactured products may reduce their
taxable income by the same proportion that export sales
bear to total sales.231
ii. Tax on Foreign Remittances
Remittances of earnings abroad are subject to a 25 per
cent withholding tax;2 3 2 but this amount may be reduced
or refunded in amounts equal to an exporter's expenses
228 North, EMBRAER Flies EMB-120 Prior to Rollout, Av. WK & SPACE TECH.,
Aug. 8, 1983, at 28.
229 I.R.C. §§ 991-997 (1971); STRENG, supra note 223, at 105-23.
210 Tax Reform Act of 1983, I.R.C. §§ 921-927 (1983). Generally, a DISC was a
domestic U.S. company which was not itself taxable. In contrast, a FSC must be
created or organized under the laws of jurisdictions outside the United States.
The FSC is not taxable on exempt foreign trade income. See 1 Irr'L TRADE REP.
(BNA) at 702 (Dec. 12, 1984). This change was made to comply with the GATT
requirements concerning subsidies.
23, Decree Law 1158 of Mar. 16, 1971, art. 1, 35 LEX (Braz.) 179; and Decree
Law 1721 of Dec. 3, 1979, art. 1, 43 LEX (Braz.) 929. In calculating the deduction,
the equation EE x 100/TE should be used; EE is the export earnings and TE is the
total earnings of the company. PINHEIRO, supra note 31, at § 6.118.
Companies engaged in foreign trade may also deduct as expenses payments
made abroad for promotion, trademark registration, advertising, market research,
leasing of exhibition space, costs of representational offices, warehouses and en-
trepots. Decree Law 491 of Mar. 5, 1969, art. 7, 33 LEX (Braz.) 252; Decree 64,833
ofJuly 17, 1969, art. 11, 33 LEx (Braz.) 968; and Directives No. 183 of May 26,
1976 and No. 210 of May 4, 1977 of the Ministry of Finance, cited in BANCO Do
BRASIL, supra note 225, at 63 n.3.
2-2 Decree 76,186 of Sept. 2, 1975, art. 344. So long as profits do not exceed
12% of the registered investment (as calculated over a three year average), no
further withholding tax is imposed. Amounts in excess of this ceiling are subject
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for commissions, discount fees, advertising, international
fairs, etc.233
iii. Drawbacks
The drawback system authorizes exemptions, suspen-
sions or refunds for exported goods of the duties initially
paid for imported raw materials, parts and components.
This arrangement also permits exemptions or refunds of
the ICM tax (Tax on the Circulation of Merchandise) 234
paid on such goods.235 Special legislation would even al-
low the duty-free importation of an entire factory into the
nation, as long as its output is designated for export.23 6
iv. Miscellaneous Taxes
Operations connected with exports are exempt from
the Tax on Financial Operations, which is a tax imposed
on the purchase of foreign exchange.237 In addition, in-
to taxes at progressively higher rates. Law 4131 of 1962, arts. 3 & 4; Law 4390 of
1964, art. 1, 28 LEX (Braz.) 850.
255 Decree Law 1118 of 1970, art. 3, and Decree Law 1189 of 197 1, art 6, cited in
TEBECHRANI, supra note 62.
234 Decree Law 406 of Dec. 31, 1968, 32 LEX (Braz.) 1550, Complementary Act
35 of Feb. 28, 1967, cited in BANCO Do BRsIL, supra note 225, at 64, n.10. The
ICM is essentially a sales tax imposed by each state within Brazil. Typically the
ICM tax ran around 14% in the southern part of the nation and 15 percent in the
northern states. ARAOJO, supra note 194, at 30. See also, Silva Martins, Hipdtese de
Incidincia de ICM in CURSO DE DIREITo TRIBUTRIO 291 (I. Curso ed. 1982) [here-
inafter cited as Curso]; Carvalho, A Naturezajundica do ICM, Curso at 309; Pinto da
Silva, 0 ICM e as Isen5es, Curso at 319; Boniiha, Lan~amento do ICM, Curso at 349;
D'Ega, Sistemdtica do ICM, Curso at 357.
21 Decree Law 37 of Nov. 18, 1966, art. 78, 30 LEX (Braz.) 1636; Complemen-
tary Law No. 4 of Dec. 2, 1969 and Decree 68,904 ofJuly 12, 1971, cited in BANCO
DO BRASIL, supra note 225, at 64 n. 18.
256 Decree Law 1244 of Oct. 31, 1972, 36 LEX (Braz.) 1402; Rosenn, Regulation
of Foreign Investment in Brazil: A Criticial Analysis, 25 LAw. AM. 307, 339 & n. 135
(1983).
23,7 Decree Law 5143 of Oct. 20, 1966, 30 LEX (Braz.) 1460; ; Decree Law 914 of
Oct. 7, 1969, 33 LEX (Braz.) 1413; Decree Law 1269 of Apr. 18, 1973, 37 LEX
(Braz.) 448; Decree Law 1,844 of Dec. 30, 1980, 44 LEX (Braz.) 1067; Resolutions
Nos. 253 (Mar. 15, 1972), 329 (July 16, 1975), 330 (July 16, 1975) & 352 (Dec. 2,
1979), cited in BANCO Do BRAsIL, supra note 224, at 64, n.19; see also Rosenn, supra
note 236, at 331. At the end of 1980, this tax was increased from 15% to 25%.
Rosenn, supra note 236, at 33 1; Akselrad, Imposto sobre 0pera~jes Financeiras - IOF,
in Silva Martins, supra note 234, at 431, 433. EMBRAER was exempted from this
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ternational transport services are exempt from the Tax on
Transportation Services 238 and from social security contri-
butions, as well as the tax on fuels (when destined for ex-
port or for supplying foreign or national ships on
international trips). 239
c. The Special BEFIEX Program
Companies which accept a long term commitment to
export a stipulated portion of their production may qual-
ify for the special incentives granted by BEFIEX (the
Commission for the Concession of Fiscal Benefits and
Special Export Program). Generally, such export obliga-
tions have a duration of ten years, although recently some
five year agreements have been accepted.2 40 Additionally,
the net value of a qualifying company's average annual ex-
port of manufactured products must be at least three
times the value of its imports.24 '
Incentives available under this program include: a 70 to
90 percent reduction in import duties and IP1242 taxes on
tax by Central Bank Resolution No. 674 according to the GAZETA MERCANTIL.
Godoy, Em Detalhe, a Acusa~do de Fairchild, GAZETA MERCANTIL, Aug. 19, 1982, at
11.
228 Decree Law 1428 of Dec. 2, 1975, 39 LEX (Braz.) 740; Decree Law 1582 of
Nov. 17, 1977, 41 LEx (Braz.) 866.
239 Decree Law 1505 of Dec. 23, 1976, 40 LEX (Braz.) 1001; Decree Law 1556 of
June 7, 1977, 41 LEX (Braz.) 46; Decree 79,789 ofJune 7, 1977, 41 LEX (Braz.)
347.
240 PINHEIRO, supra note 31, at § 6.124; Rosenn, supra note 236, at 340.
24 Rosenn, supra note 236, at 340.
242 PINHEIRO, supra note 31, at § 6.123. The IPI tax (tax on manufactured prod-
ucts) is essentially a value added tax which is applied to transfers of parts and raw
materials at each stage of the production process. Law 5172 of Oct. 25, 1964, art.
46-48, 28 LEX (Braz.) 1031. On non-luxury items, the rates range from 3 percent
to 20 percent. Decree 70,162 of Feb. 18, 1972, 36 LEX (Braz.) 137. See also, Wag-
ner, Imposto sobre Produtos Industrializados-IPI- Sistemdtica, in Silva Martins, supra
note 234, at 249; Paciello, Imposto Sobre Produtos Industrializados-IPI- Classificado,
in Silva Martins, supra note 234, at 275.
Export sales are exempt from IPI taxes. Law 5172 of Oct. 25, 1966, art. 7-I, 28
LEx (Braz.) 1031. The manufacturing exporter, however, was allowed to credit
the IPI taxes he previously paid on raw materials and components of the exported
goods against other IPI taxes he may have owed. Id. art. 7-XXIV, § 1.
In addition to the credits for IPI taxes actually paid, the exporter was allowed an
additional credit against IPI taxes for the amount of IPI tax which would have
been paid had the product been sold in Brazil. The rate applicable in this case,
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imported machinery and equipment; and a 50 percent re-
duction on duties and IPI taxes on imported raw materi-
als, components and intermediate parts. The President of
Brazil may authorize a total exemption from these
charges. Profits attributable to exports may be totally ex-
empted from income tax. Finally, any losses of such firms
may be carried forward for an extra two years.243
d. EMBRAER'S Use of Export Incentives
EMBRAER certainly took advantage of a substantial
number of these export incentives. This, in turn,
prompted the Fairchild Swearingen Corporation to bring
a countervailing duty proceeding against EMBRAER in
the United States, alleging that such benefits constituted
an export subsidy.
Export subsidies can be subject to retaliatory sanctions
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT),244 of which both Brazil and the United States are
members. 24 5  Thus, before • discussing the
Fairchild/EMBRAER case, some background on the perti-
nent GAT norms and the U.S. law is required.
4. Subsidies and Countervailing Duties: The Interface of
Brazilian Law With International and Foreign Law
a. GATT Rules
Section b of article XVI of the GATF, adopted in 1955,
provides that the "contracting parties shall cease to grant
either directly or indirectly any form of subsidies on the
however, could not exceed 15%. Even if the product exported would have been
exempt from the IPI tax if sold in the internal market, the tax was deemed to have
been paid and could be credited against other IPI taxes. Decree Law 491 of Mar.
5, 1969, arts. 1 & 2, 33 LEx 252.
The United States complained that this IPI credit amounted to an export sub-
sidy in violation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), see infra
GATT, note 244. In response, Brazil recently eliminated the IPI "credit" for the
BEFIEX program. Rosenn, supra note 236, at 340.
213 Decree Law 1428 of Dec. 2, 1975 art. 1, 39 LEx (Braz.) 740; Decree 77,065
of Jan. 20, 1976, art. 6, 40 LEX (Braz.) 82.
244 U.S. Dep't. of State, Treaties in Force (S9.14:982 1982).
245 GATT, supra note 244, at para. 9.
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export of any product other than a primary product. 246
This provision, subscribed to only by the industrialized
nations, has been honored more in the breach than in
compliance. 47
A countervailing duty is a charge imposed by an import-
ing nation upon goods subsidized by the country of ori-
gin; such duty is intended to offset the "unfair advantage"
the foreign items, as a result of the subsidy, would have
over similar domestic products.2 48  Article VI of the
GATT authorizes the imposition of a countervailing duty
whenever subsidies "cause or threaten material injury to
an established domestic industry, or. . . retard materially
the establishment of a domestic industry. 249
i. The Subsidies Code
Concerned about widespread use of subsidies and their
effect on international trade, the GATT nations at the
1979 Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations
adopted the Code on Subsidies and Countervailing
Duties.250
a. General Prohibitions
Article 9 of the Code reaffirms the prohibition on ex-
port subsidies for manufactured goods. That ban does
not apply to non-export subsidies, i.e., domestic subsidies
granted without regard to exports. While acknowledging
that domestic subsidies are "widely used as important in-
struments for the promotion of social and economic pol-
246 B. BALASSA, THE TOKYO ROUND AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 15 (World
Bank Staff Working Paper No. 370, 1980).
247 Note, ITC Injury Determination in Countervailing Duty Investigations, 15 L. & POL.
INT'L Bus. 987 (1983).
248 GAIT, supra note 244, paras. 3 & 6(a), at 214.
249 Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 513,
T.I.A.S. No. 9619 [hereinafter cited as Subsidies Code]. The U.S. President was
authorized to accept this Agreement by 19 U.S.C. § 2503 (c)(5) (1979), and did so
in Memorandum of President, Determination Regarding Multilateral Trade Nego-
tiations, Dec. 14, 1979. Id.
250 Subsidies Code, supra note 249, art. 11, para. 2 and art. 8, para. 3.
5571985]
558 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE
icy objectives, "251 the Code exhorts its signatories to
avoid causing adverse effects on industries of other mem-
ber countries through overuse of domestic subsidies.252
Article 13 deals with the right of an adversely affected sig-
natory to take countermeasures against domestic subsi-
dies that cause serious prejudice.2 53
Article 14, however, recognizes that subsidies are an in-
tegral part of many development programs 254 and ex-
empts developing countries from the obligation to forego
using export subsidies for manufactured goods.255 Devel-
oping nations are not subject to any countervailing action
simply by reason of granting export subsidies per se. In
addition, no retaliatory action may be taken against these
nations where their use of export subsidies leads to dis-
placement of exports of another signatory in third country
markets. Finally, domestic subsidies such as government
grants, loans, and guaranties are not to be considered
subsidies per se in the case of the developing nations.256
b. The Injury Requirement
Developing nations may, however, be subjected to
countervailing duties, if their subsidized exports cause
"material injury to a domestic industry, threat of material
injury to a domestic industry, or material retardation of
the establishment a domestic industry. ' 257 This injury
test is restricted to a "like product. ' 258 From the point of
251 Id. at art. 11, para. 2 & art. 8, para. 3.
252 Id. at art. 13, para. 4; see also Rivers & Greenwald, The Negotiation of A Code on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures: Bridging Fundamental Policy Differences, 11 L. &
POL. INT'L Bus. 1447, 1474, n. 116 [hereinafter cited as Rivers].
25 Subsidies Code, supra note 249, at art. 14, para. 1.
254 Id. at art. 14, para. 2. The rules on export subsidies for primary products
apply equally to both developing and developed nations. Id. at art. 14, para. 10 &
art. 10.
215 Id. at art. 14, para. 7.
256 Id.; Subsidies Code, supra note 249, at art. 2, n.6.
257 Id. at art. 6, para. 6(c). The Code defines a like product as one "which is
identical, i.e., alike in all respects to the product under consideration or in [its]
absence. . . another product which . . . has characteristics closely resembling
those of the product under consideration." Id. at n.18.
258 Because the U.S. countervailing duty law antedated the GATT, the United
[50
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view of the developing nations, the principle advantage of
the Code is the agreement by the United States to require
a finding of "material injury" to domestic industry as a
precondition to imposing a countervailing duty.259
c. Causation
Article IV of the GATT is silent as to the exact nature of
the "causal link" required between a subsidy paid on ex-
ports and the "material injury" to domestic industry.
Thus, the question arose whether the subsidy must be the
"principal cause" of such injury. Prior experience had in-
dicated that the "principal cause" formulation had proved
an impossible standard.260 Finally, a less demanding stan-
dard was adopted: "[i]t must be demonstrated that the
subsidized imports are, through the effects of the subsidy,
causing injury within the meaning of this Agreement. 26 1
d. Countervailable Subsidies
An Annex to the Subsidies Code sets forth an illustra-
tive list of export subsidies. Exemption, remission, defer-
States had not been subject to the GAT rules in the countervailing duty area.
Thus, previously, the U.S. law in most cases permitted the imposition of counter-
vailing duties on subsidized products even though no injury to American industry
had been shown. Rivers, supra note 252, at 1453.
The Code also directs the developing nations to refrain from using subsidies in
a manner that will cause serious prejudice to the trade or production interests of
other signatories and calls upon them to enter into a "commitment to reduce or
eliminate export subsidies when the use of such export subsidies is inconsistent
with its competitive and developmental needs." Subsidies Code, supra note 249,
art. 14, para. 5. Although the language sounds like "mumbo jumbo," it repre-
sents the position of the United States that advanced developing countries, like
Brazil, South Korea, Mexico and Taiwan, should agree to phase out their export
subsidies on manufactured products over a reasonable period of time, such as five
years. The U.S. position was that if an advanced developing nation is unwilling to
agree on an export subsidy phase-out schedule, the United States will not consent
to the application of the Code between it and the nation concerned. For this rea-
son the United States was careful to include a provision in the Code for nonappli-
cation between signatories. Id. art. 19, para. 9; see also Rivers, supra note 252, at
1382; Note, Mexico's Computer Decree: The Problem of Performance Requirements and a
U.S. Response, 14 L. & POL. INT'L Bus. 1159, 1187 (1983).
25 Rivers, supra note 252, at 1483-84.
2(0 Subsidies Code, supra note 249, at art. 6, para. 4.
2 1 Id. at Annex, para. e.
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ral of direct taxes (income tax), or social welfare taxes
(e.g., social security) on exported goods are examples.262
Also included are the exemption or refund of indirect
taxes (sales, excise, turnover, value added, stamp, etc.) on
exported items.263 Clearly, a number of the Brazilian ex-
port incentives described above would qualify as "subsi-
dies" under these broad definitions.
Even export credits granted by governmental institu-
tions, like Exim Bank or CACEX, are treated as subsidies,
if the financing is extended at "rates below those which
[the governments] actually have to pay for the funds so
employed .... -264 Nevertheless, such export credits
are not treated as prohibited subsidies if the government
involved is a party to an international undertaking on offi-
cial export credits.265 The industrialized nations are all
members of just such an undertaking - the Arrangement
on Guidelines for Officially Supported Export Credits,
which establishes minimum interest rates.266 Under the
Subsidies Code, nonmember nations, like Brazil, may es-
cape having their export credits considered subsidies if in
practice their interest rates are in conformity with the
rates set by that international group.26 7
ii. The GATT Civil Aircraft Agreement
At the 1979 Tokyo Round, the GATT members also
262 Id. at Annex, para. g.
263 Id. at Annex, para. k.
2C4 Id.
265 ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE Ex-
PORT CREDIT FINANCING SYSTEMS IN OECD MEMBER COUNTRIES 7 (1982). In
1981, these minimum rates ranged from 11.15 percent to 9.25 percent depend-
ing upon length of the maturities and the economic status of the recipient nation.
Id. at 13.
26 Subsidies Code, supra note 249, at Annex, para. k.
267 Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 619, T.I.A.S.
No. 9620, approved as amended by 19 U.S.C. § 2503(c)(10) (1983) [hereinafter cited
as Aircraft Agreement]; Memorandum of President, Determination Regarding
Mulitlateral Trade Negotiations, Dec. 14, 1979, Id., annotations. See also Asian
Wall St.J., Apr. 17, 1979, at 12, col. 1 & Apr. 13, 1979, at 1, col. 3.
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concluded an Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft.268
Article 6 of that Agreement did three things: (1) it reaf-
firmed the basic principles of the Subsidy Code, (2) obli-
gated its signatories to "seek to avoid adverse effects on
trade in civil aircraft . . .", and (3) stated that the pricing
of civil aircraft should be based on a "reasonable expecta-
tion of recoupment of all costs. '269 The U.S. negotiators,
however, did not succeed in their efforts to include provi-
sions which would have established parameters on export
credit financing for civil aircraft. 7 0
As of mid-1981, Brazil had not signed this aircraft ac-
cord.2 7' Since it was negotiated to meet the needs of the
American, Canadian, Western European and Japanese
2- Note, Technical Analysis of the Civil Aircraft Agreement, 12 L. & POL. INT'L Bus.
243, 248 (1980).
269 Piper, Unique Sectoral Agreement Establishes Free Trade Framework, 12 L. & POL.
INT'L Bus. 221, 229 (1980). A 1975 OECD "standstill agreement" provided basic
guidelines for acceptable export credit financing of aircraft. These guidelines
were not always followed, and moreover, the OECD, composed of the industrial
nations, does not include Brazil.
270 EMBRAER Achieving Gains with Commuters, Trainers, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH.,
June 8, 1981, at 402. A key aspect of the Agreement was the establishment of a
free trade regime within this industry. Signatories are required to eliminate for
member nations all duties on imports of civil aircraft, parts, engines, and compo-
nents. Aircraft Agreement, supra note 267, 31 U.S.T. at 619, art. 2.
The United States subsequently reduced its prior 5% duty on civil aircraft to
zero, not only for the members of the Aircraft Agreement, but for all nations enti-
tled to most favored nations treatment, including Brazil. U.S. INT'L TRADE
COMM'N PUB. No. 1448, TARIFF SCHEDULES OF THE UNITED STATES, pt. 6 at 184,
item 694.41 (1984); interview with B. Chambers, Office of the Director, U.S. Cus-
toms Dep't., in Dallas, Texas (Nov. 28, 1984).
On January 3, 1985, the President announced elimination of duties on a variety
of aircraft equipment and parts, including automatic door closers, pumps, various
gears, etc. 2 INT'L L. TRADE REP. (BNA) 75 (1985).
For safety and environmental reasons, all nations have regulations affecting the
construction and operation of airplanes. The Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade, also concluded during the GATT Tokyo Rounds, prohibits discriminatory
application of product standards, testing and certifications systems. Agreement
on Technical Barriers to Trade, done Mar. 29, 1979, art. 2,
MMTN/NTM/W/192/Rev. 5, reprinted in Agreements Reached in the Tokyo
Round of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, H.R. Doc. No. 153, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 1., at 209-56. This prohibition is incorporated expressly into the Air-
craft Agreement by art. 3.
271 Until 1980 the Treasury Department was responsible for countervailing duty
investigations. That responsibility was transferred to the Commerce Department
under Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 69,273 (1979).
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manufacturers, there is probably little incentive for Brazil
to join.
b. The United States Law
In 1979, the U.S. Congress passed the Trade Agree-
ments Act, in part to bring the American countervailing
duty and subsidy law into conformity with the above de-
scribed GATT norms. The U.S. statute, however, does
not distinguish between developed and developing coun-
tries. A countervailing duty may be imposed after a series
of affirmative administrative determinations.
i. The Administrative Process
The system is bifurcated with the Department of Com-
merce (acting through the International Trade "Adminis-
tration") and the "International Trade Commission"
making separate determinations on different facets of
countervailing duty inquiry. First, the U.S. Department of
Commerce2 72 has twenty days from the time a petition is
filed in which to make a sufficiency determination, which
is comparable to deciding if a cause of action has been
stated in a civil case.273 For instance, the presence of a
272 19 U.S.C. § 167la(c)(3)(1982).
27- To qualify as a "country under the Agreement", a nation must be a signa-
tory of the GATT Subsidies Code or must have assumed obligations vis-A-vis the
United States which are substantially similar to those of the Code, or must be a
country accorded most favored nations status. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(b)(1982).
Mexico, for example, could meet none of these alternative requirements. She is
not a member of GATT or of the Subsidies Code; nor had she assumed compara-
ble obligations. Finally, no most favored nations agreement had been concluded
between the United States and Mexico. Consequently, countervailing duties
could be imposed against Mexican goods, even though no proof of injury to
American industry is involved. No determination by the International Trade
Commission was required to impose a countervailing duty against these non-
Agreement countries. 19 U.S.C. § 1303(b). For a detailed description of the nu-
merous countervailing duties proceedings brought against Mexican products, see
Glick, LegalAspects of Trade with Mexico in SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY, DOING
BUSINESS WITH MEXICO ch. 34, § 34.04[4] (T. Reiner & A. Reiner ed. 1980; B.
Carl ed., 1980-83; S. Lefler ed. 1984-5). On April 12, 1985, Mexico and the
United States signed a bilateral agreement which would afford Mexico the benefit
of an injury test in countervailing duty investigations. 2 INT'L TRADE REP.
(BNA)(1985). Text of Agreement reprinted Id. at 590.
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subsidy would have to be alleged. At this point, the Com-
merce Department must also ascertain whether the ex-
porting nation is a "country under the Agreement. 274 If
so, no countervailing duty may be imposed unless there is
also a finding of injury to the American industry.275 Brazil
has been held to be a "country under the Agreement. '2 76
To institute an action against such an "agreement coun-
try," the petitioner simultaneously should have filed a pe-
tition before the International Trade Commission (ITC),
which then has 45 days to make a preliminary injury de-
termination 277 based on the best available information. A
274 Duty-free goods, even if exported from a country not "under the Agree-
ment," are free from the imposition of countervailing duties unless the injury test
can be satisfied. 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(2) (1982). Non-Agreement countries may
be able to take advantage of this provision for some of their products under the
Generalized System of Preferences, which provides for duty-free treatment of cer-
tain goods from developing nations. Id. §§ 2461, 2462. See Glick, supra note 273,
at § 34.04[3].
275 See, e.g., Certain Turboprop Transport Aircraft From Brazil, Dep't of Com.
(preliminary), Sept. 10, 1982, reprinted in 47 Fed. Reg. 39,873.
276 19 U.S.C. § 1671b(a) (1982).
277 If both decisions are affirmative, the Commerce Department then has 85
days in which to make a preliminary determination as to the amount of the sub-
sidy. 19 U.S.C. § 167lb(b) (1982). Within 75 days after that decision, Commerce
must make its final determination as to whether the merchandise in question is
subsidized. Id. § 1671 d(a). If Commerce's final determination is negative, the case
is terminated. Id. § 267 ld(c)(2), (3). If Commerce makes an affirmative final de-
termination, ITC then has 45 days from that date to make its final injury determi-
nation. Id. § 1671d(b)(2). If the ITC makes an affirmative final decision, a
countervailing duty order must be placed within seven days. Id. § 1671e(a). A
negative decision by the ITC at this stage will end the case. 19 U.S.C. § 167 1d(c)
(1982). See also, Note, ITC Injury Determination in Countervailing Duty Investigations,
15 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 987 (1983). An example of this procedure in operation
can be seen in Special Commodity Group on Non-Rubber Footwear from Brazil v.
Baldridge, 575 F. Supp. 1288 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983).
The investigation also may be terminated if the exporter or the foreign govern-
ment accepts an agreement which has the effect of eliminating or offsetting the
subsidy, halting exports of the subsidized goods to the United States, or totally
eliminating the injurious effect of the subsidized goods. 19 U.S.C. § 1671c(b)(1),
(2) (1982).
Countervailing duty determinations are subject to judicial review by the United
States Customs Court of International Trade. The standard for review depends
on the nature of the challenged determination. Preliminary determinations must
be reviewed on the basis of the information before the agency at the time of the
decision. "De novo" review is precluded and the question before the court is
simply whether the agency's action was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discre-
tion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(A)
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negative determination by Commerce on the sufficiency
issue or by the ITC on the injury question at this point
will terminate the investigation.278
ii. The Initiating Party
The Department of Commerce may initiate a counter-
vailing duty investigation sua sponte if warranted by the
available information.279 Alternatively, an investigation
may be started by a petition from an interested domestic
party. Such parties include a U.S. manufacturer, producer
or wholesaler of a like product; a union or group of work-
ers representing the industry; or a trade association the
majority of whose members are engaged in producing or
wholesaling such products. 8 0 In practice, most investiga-
tions are begun by private "interested" parties.
iii. Meaning of "Subsidy"
The Trade Agreements Act defines "subsidy" as any
"bounty or grant" bestowed on imported merchandise;
this can also include "domestic subsidies."' 28 ' Examples
of domestic subsidies are listed in the statute:
(i) The provision of capital, loans, or loan guarantees on
terms inconsistent with commercial considerations.
(1982); S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 38, 51-52, reprinted in 1979 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 381, 414 [hereinafter cited as S. Rep. No. 249] and H.R.
REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 181 (1979). For an example of a review in-
volving merchandise from Brazil, see Republic Steel Corp. v. United States, 591 F.
Supp. 640 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984).
"De novo" review of final determinations is likewise precluded. S. REP. No.
249, supra this note, at 248, 252. The applicable standard of review for final deter-
minations is whether the administrative action is "unsupported by substantial evi-
dence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with the law." 19 U.S.C.
§ 1516a(b)(l)(B) (1982).
The government is charged with monitoring the effect of any countervailing
duties imposed and, when appropriate, obligated to revoke them. See, e.g., Cotton
Yarn From Brazil: Partial Revocation of Countervailing Duty Order, Dep't of
Com., Aug. 31, 1984, 49 Fed. Reg. 34,546 (1984).
278 19 U.S.C. § 1761a(a) (1982).
279 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a(b)(l), 1677(9)(C)(D) & (E) (1982).
280 19 U.S.C. § 1677 (5) (1982).
28' 19 U.S.C. § 1677 (5)(b) (1982).
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(ii) The provision of goods or services at preferential
rates.
(iii) The assumption of any costs or expenses of manufac-
ture, production, or distribution.2"2
Unlike the GATT Subsidies Code, which recognizes that
certain domestic subsidies have legitimate and beneficial
purposes, the United States law makes no such
distinction.
Under this provision, the Commerce Department has
decided that government equity participation-whether
through stock ownership or an outright grant-consti-
tutes a countervailable subsidy, if the funds are provided
on terms "inconsistent with commercial considera-
tions. '2 8 3 For instance, Commerce treated equity funding
by the foreign governments as a key component of the
countervailing duty margins recently levied against cer-
tain steel products from Belgium and various other Euro-
pean nations.28 4 As indicated in the first part of this
article, Brazil was unable to find a private company to pro-
duce the Bandeirante; thus, the initial capitalization of
EMBRAER by the government (as well as its subsequent
increases) might well be considered as "inconsistent with
commercial considerations."
282 See, e.g., Appendix 2, Certain Steel Products from Belgium, 47 Fed. Reg.
39,304, 39,319-23 (1982).
283 Barshefsky, Mattice & Martin, Government Equity Participation in State Owned
Enterprises: An Analysis of the Carbon Steel Countervailing Duty Cases, 14 L. & POL. INT'L
Bus. 1101, 1112 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Barshefsky]. See also Preliminary Af-
firmative Countervailing Duty Determinations: Certain Steel Products from
Belgium, 47 Fed. Reg. 26,300-48 (1982).
Brazil also had been involved in this proceeding, but was excluded by the Com-
merce Department after Brazil agreed to impose a steel export tax which would
completely offset its steel subsidies. Barshefsky, supra at 1112 n.58.
In another proceeding filed on September 18, 1984, by the Cast Iron Pipe Fit-
tings Committee, a group representing the industry, the Commerce Department
found that imports of cast iron pipe fittings from Brazil were receiving govern-
ment subsidies estimated at 21.18% of their invoiced value. On November 2, the
ITC found reasonable indication of injury. The Commerce Department is due to
render its final determination by Feb. 15, 1985. 1 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 766
(1984).
284 United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 569 F. Supp. 864, 865 n.2 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1983) (citing 47 Fed. Reg. 26,310 (1982)).
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A number of Brazil's export incentives have already
been found to be countervailable, such as the income tax
exemption for export earnings, preferential working capi-
tal financing for exports, accelerated depreciation on Bra-
zilian made capital goods,285 and the IPI tax credits.28 6
Recently, responding to pressure from the United States,
Brazil abolished the IPI tax credit portion of the BEFIEX
program.287 Reportedly, EMBRAER was persuaded by
the U.S. Government in 1981 to forego a 15 percent ex-
port incentive in order to avoid imposition of a counter-
vailing duty.288
iv. Definition of a "Like" Product
The domestic industry against which the impacts of al-
legedly subsidized imports are to be assessed is described
as "the domestic producers as a whole of a 'like' product,
or those producers whose collective output of the 'like'
product constitutes a major proportion of the total do-
mestic production of that product. 2 89 "Like product" is
defined as a product which is "like, or in the absence of
like, most similar in characteristics and uses with, the arti-
cle subject to an investigation .... 290
28- Carbon Steel Rods from Brazil, Suspension of Investigation, Dep't of Com-
merce (Int'l Trade Admin.), 47 Fed. Reg. 42,400 (1982), reprinted in 21 Ir'"L L.
LEG. MAT'L. 1411; Frozen Concentrated Orange Juice, Inv. No. 701-TA-184 (Fi-
nal), USITC Pub. No. 06 (July 1983), summarized in 5 INr'L TRADE REP. (BNA)
1391 (1983). See supra note 242 for a description of the IPI tax credit.
2" See supra note 242.
2", Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., June 8, 1981, at 403.
288 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(A) (1982).
289 19 U.S.C. § 1677(10) (1982).
2- Silva contends the only similar plane is a Fairchild-SAAB-340 which is not a
United States plane. Latin American Markets, 90 FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Aug. 17,
1984, at 6.
D. Ekedahl, president of the Regional Airline Association has said that United
States manufacturers chose to a large degree "not to enter the growing market-
place for small commercial transport aircraft used by regional and commuter air-
lines..." Consequently, he indicated that his organization would "fight any
efforts to impose trade sanctions which would be borne primarily by United States
airline customers of imported aircraft and the millions of passengers they carry."
GAMA Predicts Low Aircraft Export Levels, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 4, 1982, at
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An advantage of the new "Brasilia" model lies in its dis-
similarity to any airplane now being produced in the
United States. According to President Silva, "There's no
plane of the same class being projected or built in the
US-we're not taking the market away from anyone. "291
Thus, the theory goes, the craft should be free from a
countervailing duty challenge.292
v. "Material Injury" Test
To impose a countervailing duty against an "agreement
country," the ITC must find that the United States indus-
try is "materially injured,. . . threatened with material in-
jury, or [that] the establishment of an industry in the
United States is materially retarded. ' 293 Of these three
possible findings, the first (material injury) and the third
(material retardation), expressly require current, palpa-
ble, measurable injury to an actual or anticipated domes-
tic industry. 294 The standard for finding a "threat" of
material injury is more difficult to define and is subject to
291 On the other hand, a countervailing duty may be imposed against a subsi-
dized import if it materially retards the establishment of United States industry.
19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(2)(B) (1982).
It might be noted that "material retardation" of an American industry was not
in issue in the "Bandeirante" countervailing duty investigation. Certain Com-
muter Airplanes From Brazil, 47 Fed. Reg. 44,166-67 & n.15 (1982). E. Stimp-
son, president of the General Aviation Manufacturers Association, acknowledging
that American manufacturers had not developed commuter aircraft in the 25-40
passenger range, has said that foreigners can enter this market more easily "be-
cause foreign governments, unlike the U.S., fully support the research, develop-
ment, production and marketing of specific aviation products." GAMA Predicts
Low Aircraft Export Levels, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 4, 1982, at 24.
292 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (1982). For an example of an ITC injury investigation
involving Brazilian goods, see Certain Agricultural Tillage Tools From Brazil, 49
Fed. Reg. 42,971 (1984) (initiating investigation of Brazilian agricultural tillage
tools). See also 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 337 (Jan. 1, 1985) (announcing a pre-
liminary countervailing duty investigation regarding iron ore from Brazil).
29.1 S. REP. No. 249, supra note 277, at 86-87, 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 472-73.
294 S. Madden, The Threat of Material Injury Standard in Countervailing Duty Enforce-
ment, 16 L. & POL. INT'L Bus. 373, 416 (1984). For a negative finding on the issue
of injury or threat of injury, see Prestressed Concrete Steel Wire Strand from
Brazil, Inv. No. 701-TA-152 (Final), USITC Pub. No. 1358 (Mar. 1982), reprinted in
5 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 1115 (1982). This finding was upheld in Ameri-
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varying interpretations. Nonetheless, one study has con-
cluded that the ITC generally applies the "threat" stan-




The Trade Agreements Act requires that the injury re-
sult "by reason of" the alleged subsidy.29 6 The Senate
Report states that the ITC must employ the standards
prevailing under current ITC practice and procedure in
deciding this question.29 7 Under those procedures,
[t]he ITC investigates the conditions of trade and compe-
tition and the general condition and structure of the rele-
vant industry. It also considers, among other factors, the
quantity, nature, and rate of importation of the imports
subject to the investigation, and how the effects of the net
bounty or grant relate to the injury, if any, to the domestic
industry.2 9
8
The Senate Report would permit the ITC to render an
affirmative determination, even if the particular import in
question is not the "principal," or even a substantial
cause of the injury. Rather than using such a strict test,
can Spring Wire Corp. v. United States, 590 F. Supp. 1273 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984)
(substantial evidence supported finding of no material injury or threat thereof).
In the Frozen Concentrated Orange Juice from Brazil proceeding, the ITC
found that subsidized imports posed a "threat" of material injury without a con-
comitant finding of "present" material injury. Inv. No. 701-TA-184 (Final),
USITC Pub. No. 1406 (July 1983), summarized in 5 IN'r'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA)
1391 (1982). Moreover, the particular subsidies involved- income tax exemp-
tion for exports and subsidized working capital financing-were considered "in-
herently more likely to threaten injury than are other subsidies." Id. at 13 (views
of Chmn. Eckes). On August 19, 1984, the ITC initiated an investigation under
19 U.S.C. § 1675(b) to review its determination in this case. 49 Fed. Reg. 34,546
(1984).
For other affirmative "threat" of injury holdings involving Brazil, see Hot-Rolled
Stainless Steel Bar from Brazil, Inv. No. 701-TA-179-181 (Preliminary), USITC
Pub. No. 1276 (Aug. 1982); Iron Bars From Brazil, Inv. No. 701-TA-208 (Prelimi-
nary), USITC Pub. No. 1472 (Dec. 1983).
29.1 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(2) (1982).
' S. REP. No. 249, supra note 277, at 57.
297 Id.
298 Id. at 58.
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the ITC must only satisfy itself "that, in light of all the
information presented, there is a sufficient causal link be-
tween the subsidization and the requisite injury. '2 9 9
c. The "Bandeirante" Case
In 1982, the Fairchild Swearingen Company filed a
countervailing duty petition with the International Trade
Administration of the Department of Commerce against
the 19-passenger Bandeirante.3 0 0  Fairchild alleged that
the plane was receiving twelve different subsidies, includ-
ing the IPI export premium, income tax exemptions for
export earnings, special tax benefits under BEFIEX, pref-
erential working capital loans, exemption from IOF taxes,
income tax deductions for applicable investments, special
drawback privileges, and subsidized export credits.30 '
Subsequently, Beech Aircraft joined in this petition. 2
Finding that the petition provided a sufficient basis for an
investigation, and that Brazil was a country "under the
Agreement," Commerce notified ITC, requesting com-
2- North, Import Duties on Bandeirante Weighed, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Sept. 20,
1982, at 115.
3W Certain Turboprop Transport Aircraft from Brazil, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,873
(1982); see also Godoy, Os Detalhes da Acusa~do da Fairchild, GAZETA MERCANTIL, Aug.
30, 1982, at 11.
Fairchild claimed subsidies accounted for between 39 percent and 44 percent of
the FOB price of the Bandeirante. Godoy, supra, at 11. The company also argued
that through the FINEX export credits EMBRAER was able to sell its planes at
around 8% financing, while United States companies had to charge the market
rate of about 16%. Id. EMBRAER representatives responded, however, that if
one took into account the corporate after-tax flow costs of the two aircraft, the
financing costs evened out. North, supra note 299. Moreover, EMBRAER as-
serted that its export interest rates were not as low as those of the Japanese and
Canadians. EMBRAER: 0 Successo de um Piano de V6o, REVISTA DAS CMARAS AR-
GENTINAS DE COMIRCIO DO Rio DEJANEIRO E S;o PAULO, Nov. - Dec. 1982, at 19.
Finally, EMBRAER's attorney, Donald E. Santarelli, also pointed out that, in
accord with standard international business practice, EMBRAER's customers fre-
quently have to put up additional collateral (such as a letter of credit), to secure
their loans. This can add two or more percentage points to the face amount of the
interest rate and can increase the overall borrowing cost. GAMA Predicts Low Air-
craft Export Levels, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 4, 1982, at 24.
30, North, supra note 299.
302 Certain Turboprop Transport Aircraft From Brazil, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,873
(1982).
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pletion of the preliminary injury determination by Sep-
tember 30th. 3
Fairchild Swearingen argued that the EMBRAER share
of the U.S. market had increased from 7 percent in 1978
to 35 percent in 1981. Meanwhile, Fairchild asserted, its
share of the market had dropped from 60 percent in 1978
to 30 percent in 1982. The San Antonio plant, running at
20 percent of capacity, had laid off 75 percent of its pro-
duction force. °4
On September 21, 1982, the ITC, by a three to one
vote, made a preliminary determination that the "material
injury" test had not been satisfied. A few days later,
Fairchild's request for reconsideration was denied. 5
i. Identification of "Like" Product(s)
The first issue in that hearing was which American-
made planes would be considered "like" the Bandeirante
for this purpose. The Commission noted that it would be
impossible to find all the characteristics of the
Bandeirante incorporated into any one domestic product.
In absence of such a product, the Commission had to con-
sider those planes which were "most similar" in character-
istics and uses as the imported craft. The Fairchild
Swearingen Metro III (Metro) and the Beech Corporation
C99 (C99) were found to have characteristics that "most
closely" corresponded to the Bandeirante. Although the
Metro is pressurized whereas the Bandeirante is not, this
dissimilarity did not preclude its treatment as a "like"
-'i North, supra note 299; North, Fairchild Eyes Market Share Increase, Av. WK. &
SPACE TECH., Sept. 16, 1982, at 271.
-0' Certain Commuter Airplanes From Brazil, 47 Fed. Reg. 44,166 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as ITC Inv.]; Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 4, 1982, at 24.
3w, Commissioner Stern rendered a negative finding on this question. If the
determination had been in the affirmative, significant additional information
would have been desirable on this issue in a final determination. ITC Inv., supra
note 304, at 44,167 n.8.
The ITC also excluded eight to fourteen seat domestic planes from this "like"
product category because they did not carry turboprop engines as does the




product, at least for purposes of the preliminary
investigation.
It was also noted that all three planes were "used" to
carry passengers on short-haul, low-passenger density
commuter routes. Thus, Fairchild and Beech were
treated as the "domestic industry" for purposes of the
investigation.30 6
ii. Application of the "Material Injury" Test
In making its determination on material injury, the
Commission pointed out its obligation to take into ac-
count (1) the volume of imports of the item in question,
(2) their impact on price, and (3) the consequent impact
of the imports on the domestic industry. To assess the
impact on domestic industry, the statute further called for
an evaluation of all relevant economic factors, such as
production, sales, market share, profits, productivity, re-
turn on investment, etc.3 0 7
Looking at the industry as a whole, the Commission
noted that deregulation had caused commuter airlines to
grow by 27% in 1979 and that this increase had continued
up to 1982. At the same time, production capacity of the
domestic commuter plane manufacturers had almost
doubled between 1979 and 1981, as had their total sales.
The number of workers producing commuter craft had
risen substantially from 1979 to 1981 and their wages had
increased steadily. As an individual company, Fairchild
Swearingen's net sales had almost doubled from 1979 to
1981, and profitability levels remained favorable during
this period.
On the question of import volume, the record showed
that 15 Bandeirantes had been imported from January to
June 1981 and 14 from January to June 1982. The ITC
did not consider this a significant volume and stated there
was no indication that the amount would rise
3,,, 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7) (1982); S. REP. No. 249, supra note 277, at 86-87.
507 Id. at 88.
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significantly. 8
Concerning the impact of imports on the prices of the
domestic craft, the Commission noted the difficulty of
price comparisons for planes which are really different.
For example, any comparison of the Bandeirante with the
more expensive Metro had to take into account the in-
creased costs associated with different features, such as
pressurization. 0 9  Since both the C99 and the
Bandeirante lack pressurization, this comparison was con-
sidered more informative. Although conceding that ad-
vantageous financing is a factor in any purchase decision,
the Commission held that the record did "not contain in-
formation which allows us to conclude that there is any
pattern of underselling by the allegedly subsidized im-
ports. '3 1 0 Moreover, despite a decrease in the C99's price
during the last few years, the ITC pointed out the
Bandeirante price had increased and found "there has
been no price suppression or depression by reason of im-
ported planes. ' 3 1 ' Thus, the Commission decided there
was no indication that imports had affected prices or ad-
versely impacted on profitability.
iii. Determination on Causation
Moreover, the causal link between subsidized imports
and material injury could not be satisfied. Fairchild and
Beech both claimed to have lost sales to the Bandeirante.
However, upon questioning by the ITC, all six purchas-
ers named in the lost sales allegation said they did not buy
the Metro either because of problems with its engine or
because of the extra cost of the unneeded pressurization
feature. Some of the purchasers added that they had re-
3os Would the 130 Bandeirantes now in the United States be considered signifi-
cant? Perhaps, for countervailing duty purposes, the answer should still be "no".
I Petitioners contended the current additional cost of pressurization
amounted to less than 1% of Metro's purchase price. Respondent, EMBRAER,
asserted pressurization accounted for 20% of purchase price. ITC Inv., supra note
304, at 44,168 n.26.




jected the Beech C99 because it was too small for their
requirements.3 12
The Commission concluded that "no causal nexus has
been established between the allegedly subsidized im-
ports and any recent problems which have been exper-
ienced by the domestic producers. 3 11 3  As indicated
above, a negative finding by the ITC at this stage termi-
nates the proceeding. Thus, no countervailing duty could
be imposed.
C. Overseas Operations
The typical first world multinational enterprise started
by producing for its home market. Then, as it grew, it
expanded into exporting goods overseas. Finally, it
would begin manufacturing abroad. These foreign ven-
tures could take various forms such as an equity invest-
ment, a licensing contract, a turn-key arrangement, etc.
Likewise, installation of overseas production was usually
phased in, often beginning with a simple assembly plant
and then progressively increasing the use of local compo-
nents and technology.
EMBRAER seems about to embark on a similar course.
Having gone through the first two stages-home produc-
tion and foreign exports-the company is now moving
into overseas production.
1. The Egyptian Agreement
In 1983, EMBRAER signed an accord with Egypt to
build 120 Tucanos in that country for delivery to the
312 Id. at 44,169 n.7. In addition, BUSINESS WEEK reported that "[b]uyers con-
tend that neither the Beech C99 nor. . . [the] Metro . . . matches the
Bandeirante's quality." The Commuter Plane That Flies on Financing, Bus. WK., Apr.
12, 1982, at 46.
3 ITC Inv., supra note 304, at 44,169. InJanuary 1985, the International Trade
Commission announced it would use the authority conferred under § 332(b) of
the Tariff Act to examine the impact of growing competition from imports on the
U.S. commuter and business aircraft industries. Although no public hearing is
planned, written statements may be submitted to the Commission. 2 INT'L TRADE
REP. (BNA) 215 (Feb. 6, 1985).
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Egyptian Air Force. The contract, which includes a tech-
nical assistance component, is divided into three phases.
First, ten trainers will be made in Brazil and sent to Egypt
in fly-away condition. EMBRAER will then send struc-
tural components and aircraft systems for the next group
of planes to be completed by the Arab Organization for
Industrialization at an industrial park outside Cairo. The
first flight of an Egyptian-built Tucano is scheduled for
1985. The final group is to be built in Egypt with EM-
BRAER to supply the tail section and a limited number of
component parts. 1 4
The contract, financed by Saudi Arabia,3 1 5 will bring
EMBRAER US $180 million.3 16 Upon expiration of the
four-year production schedule, the Egyptian government
may exercise an option for another 60 planes. 1 7
2. The United Kingdom/Short Brothers Arrangement
In May 1984, Short Brothers, a Belfast based aerospace
manufacturer,3 8 and EMBRAER signed a broad coopera-
tion agreement. The first program involves development
under license with EMBRAER of a Tucano version 3 9 able
to meet the requirements of the Royal Air Force. The
'4 Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Dec. 12, 1983, at 22; Asas, supra note 76; SOUTH,
June 1984, at 74.
315 British Deal May Put the Icing on 15 Year Birthday Cake, FINANCIAL TIMES
(London) Aug. 27, 1984, at 5 [hereinafter cited as British Deal].
7, Asas, supra note 76, at 8; Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Dec. 12, 1983, at 22.
317 Asas, supra note 76, at 14. This agreement is not free from criticism. It fore-
sees 80 of the planes being sent to Iraq. Such sales to areas in conflict have pro-
duced political problems within Brazil. One Brazilian congressman, Flavio
Birrenback, a member of the Committee on Security, proposed a bill to ban such
sales. "I think Honduras will use the planes against the Sandanistas, and there is a
chance for the Tucano to be used against troops once Iran's air cover gets
weaker." EMBRAER's Silva replies that this is merely concern being whipped up
by the commercial competitors. He also explains that adverse conditions in the
civil aviation industry forced EMBRAER to look toward the military sector. British
Deal, supra note 315, at 6.
318 Short is the oldest established aircraft company in the world; obviously, EM-
BRAER is one of the youngest. Collaboration Between Short and EMBRAER, BRAZIL
J., July 1984, at 9, 10 [hereinafter Collaboration].
3,' This design calls for an uprated Pratt & Whitney PT6 turboprop engine, a
revised Hawk Trainer' style cockpit environment, and British Martin Baker ejec-
tion seats. Id. at 9.
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Royal Air Force is seeking 155 new trainers to replace its
aging Jet Provost, currently in service. The Tucano is
competing with three other contenders for this £200 mil-
lion RAF contract. If the Short/EMBRAER proposal
prevails, Tucano kits320 will be shipped from Brazil for
manufacture in North Ireland. The proposal is expected
to create 600 sorely needed jobs for Belfast. 21
Both Short and EMBRAER have indicated their part-
nership will continue even if they lose the RAF award.
They are examining concepts for commuter aircraft for
the 1990's and a possible joint development of a business
aircraft. 2 Ultimately they hope to export the products of
their venture to other nations.
VI. SAFETY AND THE FLORIDA CRASH
Obviously, EMBRAER's continued success in exploit-
ing the international market depends on the reliability
and safety of its products. Thus, the Florida crash men-
tioned at the beginning of this article takes on particular
significance. Can the Bandeirante be considered a "safe"
airplane?
Between initial FAA certification of the Bandeirante in
1978 and December 1984, eleven FAA airworthiness bul-
letins were issued to airlines flying this craft.323 Directed
toward minor issues of maintenance, inspection and re-
320 Id. The original 18 competitors had been narrowed down by mid-1984 to
four: the Brazilian Tucano; the Swiss PCP-9 Pilatus; the British Firecracker; and
the Australian A-20 Wamira. ESTADO DE SAO PAULO, May 17, 1984. The Tucano
beat out the Pilatus on the Egyptian contract. British Deal, supra note 315, at 6.
321 Collaboration, supra inote 318, at 9-10.
32 Condom, supra note 8, at 1341.
32 Wall St. J., Dec. 10, 1984, at 5, col. 1. For examples of such bulletins, see
FAA Airworthiness Directives, EMBRAER Model EMB-1 10 Airplanes, Jan. 13,
1983, 48 Fed. Reg. 1483 (1983) (replacement of flight control cables); FAA Air-
worthiness Directives, EMBRAER Models EMB-IIOPI and EMB-I10P2 Air-
planes, Jan. 31, 1983, 48 Fed. Reg. 4265 (1983) (reduction in frequency of
required inspections); FAA Airworthiness Directives, EMBRAER Models EMB-
11OPI and EMB-110P2 Airplanes, Feb. 3, 1983, 48 Fed. Reg. 4771 (1983) (cor-
rection of prior directive); FAA Airworthiness Directives, EMBRAER Models
EMB-1 10PI and EMB-1 10P2 Airplanes, act. 21, 1983, 48 Fed. Reg. 48,803 (1983)
(further reduction in frequency of required inspections).
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324 Lpair, such bulletins typically originate with EMBRAER
itself or with the Brazilian CTA. EMBRAER publishes
various "Service Bulletins", and the CTA, which is re-
sponsible for airworthiness of planes in Brazil, issues or-
ders requiring compliance with those Bulletins for planes
operating under Brazilian registration. In turn, the
United States FAA relies upon the decisions of CTA com-
bined with FAA review of pertinent documentation. After
such an examination, the FAA may issue a similar direc-
tive to the operators of the plane within the United
States.325
In the Florida crash, the horizontal stabilizer and the
movable elevators had separated from the tail during the
flight.3 26 The initial inspection of the stabilizer and the
fuselage structure by the National Transportation Safety
Board showed a vertical fracture in the attachment fitting.
No evidence of metal fatigue or corrosion was obvious,
but laboratory tests are being conducted to determine if
there could have been nonvisible metal fatigue.3 27
This structural area of the Bandeirante's tail had come
under question before by both EMBRAER and the FAA.
As early as March 29, 1983, EMBRAER had issued a Ser-
vice Bulletin 328 calling for repeated visual inspections of
the fuselage structure near the horizontal stabilizer front
attachment fitting for loose rivets and cracks. If neces-
sary, the modifications prescribed in that Bulletin were to
have been made. On July 21, 1983, the FAA had issued a
similar bulletin listing 18 steps owners should take to pre-
-24 For instance, in FAA Airworthiness Directives, EMBRAER Models EMB-
1 10P2 and EMB-I10P2 Airplanes, Aug. 4, 1983, 48 Fed. Reg. 35,356 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Aug. 4 Dir.], the agency required a check of the static balance
of the ailerons, rudders and elevators, and mandating, if necessary, a rebalancing
of the appropriate control surfaces. Although the directive was treated as one of
emergency," it was characterized as "not major." Id. at 35,357.
325 See, e.g., Aug. 4 Dir., supra note 324.
326 N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1983, at A8, col. 1.
327 Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Dec. 17, 1984, at 26.
328 See, FAA Airworthiness Directives, EMBRAER Models EMB-IIlOP1 and
EMB-1 10P2 Airplanes, July 21, 1983, 48 Fed. Reg. 33,245 (1983) [hereinafter
cited as July 83 Dir.].
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vent possible separation of the horizontal stabilizer.3 2 9
That bulletin stressed that such cracks and loose rivets, "if
undetected, could result in loss of . . airplane
control."33 °
At the same time, EMBRAER, in response to com-
plaints by Bandeirante pilots of a vibration in the tail area,
had designed a new tail for the turboprop. Delivery of
these modified Bandeirantes began in late 1982, but the
plane that crashed did not have the new tail.3 3'
Provincetown-Boston Airlines (PBA), the carrier in-
volved in the Florida crash, had been grounded by the
FAA from November 11 until December 5, 1984, for al-
leged "fraudulent" actions in qualifying pilots, as well as
numerous other violations. On December 6, the company
was allowed to resume partial service and on December 8,
the crash occurred.3 32 At that point PBA voluntarily
grounded its entire fleet of Bandeirantes, pending arrival
of new structural elements, such as attachment point fit-
tings for the horizontal stabilizer.33
PBA president P. van Arsdale later insisted, "... we
did everything we had to to get recertified by the book,
rule by rule. We met all the federal standards and went
beyond them. ' 334 Many safety experts doubt that the fa-
tal break-up in flight was connected with PBA's earlier
rules violations.3 3 5
On December 9, 1984, immediately after the crash, the
FAA sent an emergency cable, subsequently codified on
January 4, 1985,336 to Bandeirante owners337 ordering
them to visually inspect the plane's empennage and make
corrections where required. This new order required in-
329 Id.; AP Videotex, Dec. 10, 1984, EST 09:46, at 562.
-o July 83 Dir., supra note 328, at 33,245.
" Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Dec. 17, 1984, at 26-27.
3-2 N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1983, at A20, col. 4.
333 Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Dec. 17, 1983, at 26-27.
3-4 AP Videotex, Dec. 10, 1983, EST 09:46, at 562.
-13 N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1983, at A20, col. 4.
336 FAA Airworthiness Directives, EMBRAER Models EMB-1IOPI and EMB-
1 10P2 Airplanes, Jan. 4, 1985, 50 Fed. Reg. 446 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Jan.
85 Dir.].
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spections in nine or ten areas additional to those set forth
in theJuly 21, 1983, directive.3 38 The inspections were to
be completed within the next ten hours of time-in-service,
and reports were to be made to the FAA within 24 hours
of any unsatisfactory conditions, such as cracks, etc.
3 39
By December 15, the FAA had received reports from
more than half the Bandeirante operators. Some re-
ported loose rivets and minor cracks, but none of the
cracks were of a magnitude requiring replacement of
structural elements. 340
Responsibility for the Florida crash has yet to be deter-
mined. On EMBRAER's behalf, the Bandeirante's safety
record worldwide is considered excellent.3 4 ' As an FAA
official said, "The aircraft has been flying since the mid-
1970's, and this is the first accident of this kind we have
had. '3 42 Although the January 4, 1985, directive did treat
the matter as one of "emergency," -it also characterized it
as "not major. '3 43 Finally, the FAA engineers in late De-
cember reported they found nothing to "raise their eye-
33 A partial list of other carriers using the Bandeirante and the number of
planes in each fleet includes:
Imperial of Carlsbad, Calif. (10)
Atlantic Southeast of Atlanta (10)
Comair of Cincinnati (10)
Southern Express of Miami (5)
Tennessee Airways of Knoxville (4)
Air Spirit of Dallas (3)
Royale of Shreveport, La. (12)
Simmons Airlines of Chicago (12)
N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1984, at B14, col. 2.
-' Id. This inspection directive should be distinguished from the DC-10 case
several years ago. After an engine had fallen off a DC-10, the FAA ordered "sus-
pension" of all DC-10 operations on June 6, 1979. 44 Fed. Reg. 33,389 (1979).
The DC-10 was not permitted to fly again untilJuly 13, 1979. 44 Fed. Reg. 42,170
(1979). In contrast, the Bandeirantes were free to fly as soon as the inspection
was completed.
339 Unless previously accomplished within the last fifty hours time-in-service.
Jan. 85 Dir., supra note 336, at 447.
340 NTSB Scrutinzes Stabilizer Loss in Crash of Bandeirante, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH.,
Dec. 17, 1984, at 26, 27.
34 N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1984, at B14, col.2.
4 NTSB Scrutinizes Stabilizer Loss in Crash of Bandeirante, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH.,
Dec. 17, 1984, at 26, 27.
14 Jan. 85 Dir., supra note 336, at 447.
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brows about" after they had reviewed the tail design and
manufacture of the Bandeirante.3 4 4 Thus far the available
evidence does not suggest questionable safety for the
craft.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Brazil has indeed constructed an innovative legal struc-
ture to develop a new industry. She has intelligently com-
bined foreign and home grown technology with local and
imported components. Public capitalization has been in-
terwoven with a unique tax mechanism for eliciting pri-
vate commitment. The availability of EMBRAER shares,
along with shares of other industries enjoying special in-
centives, has helped to develop Brazil's nascent stock
market. While distributing some earnings to EMBRAER's
private shareholders, the law has mandated the essential
reinvestment and attention to research and development.
Brazil has manipulated her internal tariffs to encourage
local use of aircraft and then later to restrict purchases of
foreign aircraft. Now it appears the country's new law on
leasing may be used to attract foreign lessors for its finan-
cially strapped domestic carriers. Although some of her
export incentives (credits, guaranties and insurance) have
been patterned after those of the industrialized nations,
she has created her own plethora of tax incentives for
exports.
Scholars have criticized the use of tax incentives to in-
duce investment. J. Heller and K. Kauffman write: "[I]t is
unlikely that . . . [tax incentives] can induce substantially
increased levels of new investments in most underdevel-
oped economies. ' 4 5 The principal obstacles to invest-
ment in developing nations are market size, lack of
confidence in the stock markets, and political instability.
344 Dallas Times Herald, Dec. 23, 1984, at 8A, col. 1.
345 J. HELLER & K. KAUFMAN, TAX INCENTIVES FOR INDUSTRY IN LESS DEVELOPED
COUNTRIES 65 (1963); see also Lent, Tax Incentives in Developing Countries, in READ-
INGS ON TAXATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 363 (R. Bird & 0. Oldman eds. 3d
ed. 1975).
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The traditional tax incentives do little to reduce these
risks. Incentives, such as tax holidays, tax exemptions,
loss carry-overs, and accelerated depreciation, are of no
value if the company never makes a profit. Once a firm is
already profitable, conventional tax incentives make the
enterprise even more profitable, but do not help reduce
risk at the initial stage.
In contrast, the EMBRAER incentives virtually elimi-
nated any risk for the taxpayer/shareholder. He could
participate in the growth of this infant industry without
jeopardizing his own funds. Thus, this mechanism might
be described as a "risk elimination" incentive. It also con-
tributed to the the stock market trading volume without
imposing any risk on the shareholder. As the growth in
the number of EMBRAER shareholders indicates (see
part II-B above), this risk elimination device did indeed
affect the investment decision.
In view of EMBRAER's success, it may be time to
change from a "risk elimination" mechanism to one of
"risk reduction". This could be done, for instance, by
gradually reducing the percentage of credit for EM-
BRAER investments. For instance, for EMBRAER share
purchases, a company might be allowed a tax credit of
75% (instead of 100%) up to a ceiling of 1 percent of tax
due. Several years later, that might be reduced to 50%;
eventually it could be phased out altogether. An advan-
tage of these risk-affecting incentives is they can be termi-
nated without jeopardizing the industries which grew up
under their support.
Alternatively, as EMBRAER consolidates its recent suc-
cesses, the time may have come for spinning off certain
projects to increase private sector involvement. Despite
EMBRAER's good record, there has been an opportunity
cost. Public monies and taxpayer funds channeled into
building these planes were not available for Brazil's other
needs.
Currently EMBRAER is managed by its controlling
shareholder, the government. The company should con-
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sider transferring some of its profitable planes to subsidi-
aries. EMBRAER could then sell enough voting shares in
these subsidiaries to shift control to the private sharehold-
ers. With successful airplanes as its chief asset, the sub-
sidiary's stock should be marketable, especially if
combined with a partial credit as suggested above. More-
over, now that the infant stage justifying government aid
for a specific aircraft has passed, production could be en-
trusted to private management and financing.
Such sales of its shares would in turn roll back money to
EMBRAER for more experimental uses. Perhaps, new
technical priorities would be appropriate and EM-
BRAER's legal mandate might be broadened to include
additional forms of transport. For example, six Chinese
technicians have just built a three-wheeled solar powered
car out of fiberglass and aluminum.346 Brazil, with its am-
ple sun, insufficient petroleum, and crowded highways,
might find working with the Peoples' Republic of China
on developing such a vehicle a useful new pursuit. Given
encouragement and additional funds, EMBRAER's engi-
neers may bring forth a variety of imaginative machines-,
e.g., a solar powered hovercraft to zip over muddy roads
in the Amazon.
The proposed privatized subsidiaries may wish to en-
gage in overseas licensing or equity investments.
Although such foreign investment would initially mean an
outflow of capital from Brazil, experience had shown that
such investments are usually returned to the home nation
(Brazil) many times over in the form of dividends, royal-
ties and/or technical assistance fees. India has already
learned this and is encouraging her entrepreneurs to in-
vest in other developing nations.
Nonetheless, private shareholders, risking their own
funds, might object to overseas investments by the priva-
346 AP Videotex, Dec. 23, 1984, 09:35 EST, at p. 274. The Guangming Daily is
reported to have said that a car built by technicians at the Hubei Provincial Metals
Society can travel at 12 miles per hour on solar batteries with enough storage
capacity to propel the vehicle 62 miles. Id.
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tized EMBRAER subsidiaries. Their concerns could in-
clude fear of expropriation of the project, inconvertibility
of currency, as well as losses due to war, revolution or in-
surrection. For some time, the industrialized nations have
offered governmental insurance to protect their own com-
panies that invest in the developing nations against just
such risks. 47 Recently, the Indian government has also
started offering Indian companies insurance against these
political risks for investments in other developing na-
tions 48 Brazil, through CACEX, might make similar in-
surance available for investments in third world nations
by Brazilian companies, such as the proposed EMBRAER
subsidies.
Other developing nations wishing to promote a specific
new industry should study the EMBRAER model. The tax
incentive devices, the capital market development laws,
and the export promotion programs all merit careful
consideration.
Of key importance here is the "appropriateness" of the
technology EMBRAER employed. That company did not
endeavor to produce a Concorde or jumbo. Rather, it
identified a gap within the home economy and designed a
relatively simple machine to fill that need. This "interme-
diate" technology then proved appropriate for other de-
veloping nations.
With such an approach, EMBRAER in essence made its
own market since no comparable product existed. Cur-
rent research in appropriate technology may produce a
number of items which could be similarly handled. For
instance, the Mexican Government has developed an in-
expensive, portable desalinator to remove salt from sea
water through the process of reverse osmosis. 3 49 This
product should prove invaluable to rural communities in
3," These various programs are described in detail in ORGANIZATION FOR Eco-
NOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, INVESTING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
(5th ed. 1982).
3,8 See EXPORT RISK INSURANCE CORP. (INDIA), ECGC (1980).
.4,j Gibbs, Potable Water from Briny Seas and Brackish Lakes, R & D MEXICO 32
(Mexican Nat'l Council of Science and Technology ed. Dec. 1981-Jan. 1982).
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desert regions; perhaps its development and marketing
could now be entrusted to an EMBRAER-type company.
Finally, the markets in the industrialized world offered
an opening which the less sophisticated, more economical
planes of EMBRAER could fill. Today, protectionist
forces appear to be gaining in Europe and the United
States. Consequently, imports from developing nations
could encounter countervailing duty problems with in-
creasing frequency. The creation of "appropriate" tech-
nology may offer the best way to circumvent this problem.
The first world in its mad dash toward space age tech-
nology often overlooks some fairly basic human needs.
This oversight could provide an area of missing technol-
ogy which might be filled by innovative enterprises in de-
veloping nations. The absence of a "like" product being
made in the importing nation could greatly reduce the
danger of countervailing duties or other protectionist
measures being applied. EMBRAER seems to have
pointed the way with its small commuter planes, its inter-
mediate AM-X, and its basic Tucano trainer.
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EMB-110C "Bandeirante"
FIGURE I MEDIAS EM ETROS
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Embraer EMB-120 "Brasilia" x
FIGURE 2
DRAWING FROM HISTORIA DA
CONSTRUQAO AERONAUTICA NO
BRASIL
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Embraer "Tucano"
FIGURE 3
DRAWING FROM HIST6RIA DA
CONSTRUOAO AERONAUTICA NO
BRASIL
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